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"NOT WAVING BUT DROWNING"*: A
LOOK AT WAIVER AND
COLLECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS IN THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS
Alan Young**
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a community of law-abiding, obedient and compliant citizens. It is
a small community. Somehow law enforcement officials have convinced the
community of the dangers of urban expansion and the accompanying blight
of urban crime, and the entire community has reached a consensus that law
enforcement officials must be trusted and given carte blanche to fight the
erosion of traditional community values. It has been agreed by each and every
resident that the police be allowed to conduct weekly, random searches of
residents'homes. This practice of random intrusion has never been the subject
of any resident's complaints except for the odd grumbling about the
inconvenience of a late night search.
Journalists have recently heard about this community of perfect docility
because a group of transient workers who were assigned to complete work on
the community dam have left complaining of continuous harassment by
officious police officers. A group of investigative journalists have travelled up
to the town to report on the event. To their surprise they are greeted by a
cheerful contingent of community residents. Deciding to play devil's advocate,
one journalist begins a campaign to convince the residents of the errors of
their ways. The residents are not at all moved by the claims of thejournalist so
* Taken from Stevie Smith, "Not Waving But Drowning", in R. Ellmann and R. O'Clair, eds.,
The Norton Anthology of Modern Poetry (New York: W.H. Norton & Company, 1988) 654.
** of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank Marie Henein, Mark
Wright and Richard Bronaugh for their many valuable comments and assistance. Iam grateful to
the Social Science and Humanities Research Small Grants Program for providing me with
funding for research on this project.
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she decides to launch a court action to challenge the practice of random and
intrusive consensual searches.
Counsel for thejournalist advises her client that the action for a declaration
of unconstitutionality would surely generate a lot of publicity but ultimately
would be doomed to failure. The journalist cannot believe that a court would
condone a practice that violates every constitutional norm designed to
constrain state power, but the lawyer does not try to explain to her all the
nuances of the law relating to standing, consent searches, reasonable
expectation of privacy, and waiver through assumption of risk. Instead he
simply says: Why would the court upset a delicate balance that has been
agreed upon and is to the satisfaction of all concerned?'
Arguably wholesale opting out of the prescriptions of the Charterof Rights
and Freedoms is permitted by the underlying conception that personal rights
are owned and freely renounceable by a rights-bearer. This conception of
rights is reflected in doctrines of standing and waiver. In order to challenge the
practice of knowing and voluntary waiver of rights it is necessary to challenge
the traditional understanding of exercising rights. But before undertaking this
challenge, it is important to show that the task is worthwhile because there is
an intuitive attraction to the lawyer's assumption that legal intervention is
inappropriate if there is not an aggrieved complainant.
Assuming that all members of the idealized community are genuinely
satisfied by the current arrangement, one must question the wisdom of an
outsider, the journalist, who has no sense of the ethos of the community and
who nevertheless presumes to know what is best for all concerned. There is
something distastefully paternalistic about the legal claim that citizens cannot
agree to forgo claiming their rights in order to attain some desired public
welfare. The problem with this intuition is that the residents' claim to
autonomy and free choice is only possible in a closed society. As the departure
of the transient workers makes clear, a community that decides to transform
its values so as to depart from national expectations must in effect close its
doors to any visitors and new settlers. A closed society within a purportedly
open one is anathema to powerful constitutional values of free association,
mobility rights, and pluralism.
Of course the idealized community scenario is overstated. Surely, it is far
less controversial if here or there citizens waive various rights in order to
secure some perceived personal advantage. What possible harm can arise out
of isolated incidents of rights renunciation? This paper will challenge the
practice of isolated failure to exercise the full extent of one's legal rights in the
For a case in which a court enjoined widespread unreasonable searches over a 19 day period,
see Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). In this case relief was granted as there
was an aggrieved citizen who took the initiative to complain; however, in this hypothetical we
are assuming that the agreement of all residents has been obtained.
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criminal process. In order to do this it will be necessary to provide a critique of
Hohfeldian personal rights. 2 It will be argued that a basic right/duty
perspective on constitutional rights is a misguided affirmation of a view of
rights that only makes sense, if it does at all, when the paradigm of the legal
universe is the law of contract and property. Constitutional rights are not
necessarily more sacred and inviolate than ordinary contractarian-type rights;
however, they are functionally distinct from rights that originate in the
ordering of private law. In essence they are more properly viewed in the
perspective of the legal correlatives of immunities and disabilities-a perspective that will ultimately lead to the replacement of personal rights with a
notion of collective rights. In this paper, a collective right will be defined as a
right that is held in common by all members of a designated class. 3 In
describing the content of the right to be tried within a reasonable time, the
Supreme Court of Canada recognized the possibility that some Charter rights
are collective in nature. In Mills v. R.,4 however, the Court held that the right
to be tried within a reasonable time is "an individual right and has no
collective rights dimension" because "the section is primarily concerned with
ensuring respect for the individual". 5 It will be argued that this perspective on
constitutional rights in the criminal process is unduly restrictive.
Legal process rights as enumerated in ss.7-14 of the Charterof Rights and
Freedoms are not designed to benefit designated individuals. They are
designed to structure and constrain governmental power, and in their
ordering of state/citizen relations they inure to the benefit of all residents. It is
improper to view an accused person as the sole owner of a given right because
"a system of rights describes the relative position of individuals or groups
within a legally defined set of institutional arrangements". 6 This notion of a
See W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1964). As has been said by W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1987) at 24, "all of Hohfeld's conceptions are relations between two distinct parties".
3 It should be noted that the discussion of collective rights in this paper will focus only upon the
legal rights that are for the benefit of society at large, as opposed to rights that attach to
distinct groups within society. Collective rights are more commonly discussed with reference
to other aspects of the Charter dealing with group rights such as language, labour and
aboriginal rights. However, these topics will not be pursued here. It is submitted that group
rights are properly conceived as being distributed severally and exclusively through all
members of the group; however, a collective right that does not attach to a designated group
or class, but rather to society at large, presents greater difficulty in distribution. The position
advanced in this paper is that a collective, societal right is not based upon the concrete
interests of its remarkably diverse members, and accordingly these rights are not personally
possessed but rather held in common. For some discussion of the notion of collective right,
see, S. Lynd, "Communal Rights" (1984) 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1417; D. Dorenberg, "'We the
People': John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action" (1985) 73 Calif. L.Rev. 52.
4 (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481 [hereinafter Mills].
5 Ibid. at 537.
6 R. Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 Harv. L.Rev. 561 at 599.
2
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rule or right being designed for society at large is not an alien concept in our
legal culture. Rules establishing the jurisdiction of criminal courts cannot be
waived even if the waiver would be to the satisfaction of all concerned. The
Supreme Court of Canada has not hesitated to declare that "jurisdiction
cannot be conferred by consent". 7 If accused individuals cannot waive
jurisdictional requirements, even those that are picayune and inconvenient in
their application, one must wonder why it is that one can waive constitutional
requirements that presumably protect fundamental interests in freedom and
8
equality.
In this examination of the phenomena of waiving, renouncing, relinquishing, forfeiting, and alienating rights, it will be argued that the movement
towards recognizing rights as collective in nature will result in a reorientation
of legal process rights as immunity rights. All residents have designated
spheres of freedom from state interference, and this immunity is protected by
the jural correlative of a state disability.9 The Supreme Court of Canada
recognized this view of rights when it declared that the Charterof Rights is
"intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent with those rights and
freedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for governmental action".' 0
However, this resounding declaration has had little practical impact because
the Court has continued to perceive legal process rights as claim-rights that
are subject to a rights-bearer's power to waive the exercise of the right. Each
and every time the rights-bearer waives a right she converts the state's
disability into an authorized action.
The reorientation of rights has dramatic implications for the subterranean
practice of waiver. The practice is subterranean because the waiver of rights
effectively shields that state/citizen encounter from the rigours of challenge in
open court. Although furtive in nature, the practice is neither isolated nor
exceptional. In fact, waiver exercises a force that is both pervasive and
self-perpetuating. This claim about the presence of waiver is not self-evident,
so before turning to the theoretical reorientation of rights, it is necessary to
demonstrate the silent entrenchment of a practice of waiving, relinquishing,
7 Phillips and Phillipsv. The Queen (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 118 at 121. See also R. v. Thompson

(1987), 3 W.C.B. (2d) 76 (N.S. C.A.).
8 It should be noted that the S.C.C. in Mills, supra, note 4, seemed to indicate that
constitutional rights do not necessarily relate to the jurisdiction of the court; thus this may
serve to distinguish the inflexibility of jurisdictional requirements from the waivability of
constitutional rights. However, the Court in the subsequent case of R. v. Rahey (1987), 33
C.C.C. (3d) at 289 [hereinafter Rahey], retreated somewhat from this position, and in any
event it will be argued that the Court is wrong in concluding that a right's violation does not go
to the heart of the court's jurisdiction.
9 These categories are borrowed from the Hohfeldian scheme, see supra, note 1.For a brief
description of Hohfeld's scheme and a definition of immunity/disability, see W.J. Kamba,
"Legal Theory and Hohfeld's Analysis of a Legal Right" (1974) Jurid. Rev. 249.
10 Hunter, Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch v. Southam
Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 156 [hereinafter Hunter].
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renouncing, or forfeiting of similarly entrenched rights. Only then will it be
possible to make a convincing case that waiving is metaphorically similar to
drowning.

II. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND PREVALENCE OF WAIVER
Adversarial justice contemplates a stylized battle between an individual and
a state representative. Accordingly, one of the purposes served by a system of
rights is to correct the balance of advantages to ensure that the adversaries are
similarly empowered. " A fair fight requires that the parties are not grossly
mismatched in terms of power and resources. If a right serves to balance
advantage then it is likely that one of the beneficiaries of the right may choose
to forgo exercising this right because of a belief that the advantage is marginal
or may even be a disadvantage in the circumstances. Adversarial justice
encourages and is consistent with the classical liberal perspective on rights
which sees a right as a vehicle for enhancing individual autonomy. The essence
of autonomy is choice, and the individual is permitted either to insist upon or
waive a right in accordance with that individual's perception of her
self-interest.
Legal systems that employ forms of adversarial justice contain rights of a
"yielding nature" 2 that bend with the wishes of the rights-bearer. Professor
Mirjan Damaska explains:
[T]he ideology of reactive government favors the conversion of law into
rights personal to citizens. And because citizens are sovereign in
determining their own interests, including their chances of success in
litigation, they are in principle free to renounce rights accorded them in
the legal process. Rights can thus be used as bargaining chips in
negotiations between procedural parties. In the end, the state's regulation
of the legal process is not much more than a baseline from which litigants
can depart when and if they so choose. Breach of a procedural regulation
is in itself not sufficient to provoke remedial action by the state. Only
when a litigant objects to the breach must the adjudicator intervene to
settle the collateral conflict; therefore, absence of an objection can be
interpreted as tacit consent to departure from the norm.' 3
The allocation of rights and safeguards has sometimes been described as a rights offset theory
"where the defendant is given a set of rights to offset the natural resource and public support
advantages of period the prosecutor". See G. Goodpaster, "On the Theory of American
Adversary Criminal Trial" (1987) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 118 at 126. See also A.
Goldstein, "The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure" (1960)
69 Yale L.J. 1149.
12 M. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1986) at 98.
11

13Ibid. at

99.
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The pervasiveness of this ideology is not noticed because it has effectively
become an accepted aspect of our legal culture. Only when our system is
compared with the legal culture of non-adversarialjurisdictions do we become
wholly aware of the structuring of our process on the basis of individual
choice. Even the non-contentious Canadian practice of allowing defendants
to choose the mode of trial (i.e. trial by provincial court judge or judge alone
or judge and jury) may "seem fantastic to a lawyer from a Continental or
communist country". 14 In order to comprehend the vast infiltration of
personal choice through waiver and related doctrines it is necessary to outline
briefly its operation at the various stages of the criminal process. Where it is
applicable reference will be made to the practice of other jurisdictions to
illustrate that individual dominion over procedural forms is neither natural
nor inevitable.
A. STANDING
Without exception, all constitutional rights need an adjudicatory forum for
their enforcement. Access to the courts is a prerequisite to the effective
enforcement of rights. Adversarial systems of justice do not allow for
unrestricted access to courts because they contemplate a stylized battle
between parties that have a direct personal interest in the outcome of the case.
Standing rules operate to insure that claims of unconstitutionality are only
brought by individuals who have been injured by state action. The Supreme
Court of Canada has recently summarized the reasons for restricting access to
the courts to challenge constitutionally infirm state action:
The traditional judicial concerns about the expansion of public interest
standing may be summarized as follows: the concern about the allocation
of scarcejudicial resources and the need to screen out the mere busybody;
the concern that in the determination of issues the court should have the
benefit of the contending parties points of view of those most directly
affected by them; and the concern about the proper role of the courts5 and
their constitutional relationship to other branches of government.'
These three reasons for restricting access to the courts are suspect. First, the
concern about scarce resources is a realistic concern but expediency should
never stand in the way of vindication of fundamental rights. Second, the
concern about having a full airing of the complaint by those most intimately
involved is based upon the questionable epistemological premises of adversary
14 Ibid.

15The Minister of Financeof Canadav. Finlay, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 at 631 [hereinafter Finlay].
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justice.' 6 There is great doubt about the superiority of party presentation, and,

in any event, if a nonparty was to bring a constitutional claim the solution is
not to deny standing but to invite the interested parties to join. Finally, the
concern about the proper institutional relationship between the judiciary and
the legislature elevates the separation of powers doctrine far beyond its
original design. 7
There may be more concern in the United States with the institutional
relationship between court and legislature because the constitution specifically requires that the judiciary restrict its interventions to a "case or
controversy".' 8 Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court would not allow an
action brought by minority residents of Philadelphia to challenge alleged
police misconduct. 9 In the lower court it was established that police
misconduct was not "rare or isolated" 20 and the court ordered that the police
draft a comprehensive program for handling citizen complaints. However, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petitioners lacked the requisite
personal stake in the outcome to establish standing because at its highest the
petitioners could only complain about the possibility of future violations of
their rights by a small minority of state officials.
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court showed how restrictive standing
rules can operate to immunize well-established and systemic constitutional
violations. 21 Adolph Lyons, a 24 year old black man living in Los Angeles, was
stopped by police on a routine car check. The police administered a chokehold
to Lyons that rendered him unconscious. Apparently, departmental policy
authorized the use of the chokehold even when no violence was threatened
against the officer and even if the officer is not trained in the technique.
Between 1975-1983 no less than 16 people died following the use of the
chokehold. Although Lyons had been personally assaulted by the police, the
court would not allow him to bring an action for an injunction barring the use
of chokeholds except in situations of reasonable self-defence. In order for

For an examination of the presumed epistemological benefits of party presentation under
adversarial justice, see M. Damaska, "Presentation and Factfinding Precision" (1975) 123 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 1083; Thibaut, "A Theory of Procedure" (1978) 66 Calif. L.Rev. 541. Left says
that "it is inherently implausible that an epistemological inquiry in the form of an agonistic
game maximizes throughness and accuracy of factual determination" in A. Leff, "Law And"
(1978) 87 Yale L.J. 989.
17 Stanley A. De Smith writes that "no writer of repute would claim that it [the separation of
powers doctrine] is a central feature of the modern British Constitution". S. A. De Smith,
Constitutional and.Administrative Law, 3d. ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1977) at 36.
Remember that the preamble of our Constitution Act, 1867, states that we are possessed of a
"constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom".
18 See Article 1II of the United States Constitution.
19Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975).
20 Ibid. at 383.
2! City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (1983).
16
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Lyons to be afforded standing the court demanded absurd and unattainable
requirements:
In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would have
had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the
police but also to make the incredible assertion either (1) that all police
officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen
to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation,
or for questioning, or (2) that22 the City ordered or authorized police
officers to act in such manner.
Presumably, the absence of a case or controversy requirement in the
Charter should mean that the standing requirements in Canada are more
relaxed. Traditionally, the opportunity for standing to challenge state action
has been limited to those who can show interference with a private right, or
where a public right is violated, to those plaintiffs who can show special
damage peculiar to themselves. 23 These requirements are relaxed to recognize
a "public interest standing" to bring an action for a declaration to challenge
the constitutionality of legislation. In this case, the court has discretion to
permit standing if the plaintiff has a genuine interest in the legislation and
there is no other reasonable and effective manner of bringing the issue before
the court. 24 In addition, unlike the American approach, standing will not be
denied solely on the basis that the complaint concerns an allegation of
25
anticipated, future violations of the Constitution.
The current doctrinal approach to standing in Canada promises more than
it can deliver. First, the discretionary grant of standing is limited to challenges
to legislation, whereas the majority of complaints about constitutional
violations concern official conduct that occurs independently of legislative
authorization. Second, the requirement that there be no other reasonable
manner of raising the issue precludes actions being brought where there is a
waiver of rights. Presumably, the court would hold that the most reasonable
manner of raising the issue would be to have the party waiving the right bring
26
the action.

22
23

24
25

26

Ibid. at 1667.
These requirements are taken from Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council, [1903] 1Ch. 109
and approved by the S.C.C. in Finlay, supra, note 15.
See Finlay, supra, note 15; Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski, [ 1981] 2 S.C.R. 575.
Operation Dismantle v. R., [1985] I S.C.R. 441 at 486; The granting of relief for prospective
violations is confirmed in R. v. Vermette, [1988] I S.C.R. 985.
This is reflected in the implicit requirement that, to challenge legislation, the citizen must first
inquire whether the Attorney General is willing to bring the action. See Finlay, supra, note 15
at 627-28. Presumably, a party waiving a right is the most appropriate litigant, and the court
may preclude another from bringing an action unless the waiving party can be convinced to
change her mind.
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In fact, the Canadian courts have followed the restrictive American
approach in granting or denying standing to challenge official conduct that is
independent of legislative authorization. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 27 the U.S.
Supreme Court would not allow standing to challenge an unconstitutional
search of a purse of a friend of the accused. The accused admitted ownership
of the contraband found in the purse, but was denied standing because (i) he
had not known the friend for a long time; (ii) he had not previously had access
to the purse; (iii) he had no right to exclude others from the purse; and (iv) he
took no precautions to protect any privacy interest he might have in the purse.
Implicit in this ruling is the view that rights are held personally, and before an
individual may complain she must show a direct interference with her interest
in property or privacy. The austerity of this individual rights approach is
reflected in other cases where the court would not allow an accused to
challenge official conduct when the police steal items which are held by a third
28
party and which can be used to incriminate the accused.
Canadian courts have followed suit. Some lower courts have been inclined
to relax the requirements for standing. 29 The consensus among the higher
courts, however, has been to conclude that the protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a personal right that can only be claimed by
one who has a proprietary interest in the premises being searched. 30 In essence,
one cannot complain if items one has entrusted to another have been
unlawfully seized. One commentator has condemned the current approach to
standing because:
It assumes that expectations of privacy stem only from narrowly
conceived property rights or other specifically articulated relatonships.
Its background assumption is one of radical individualism rather than
one of shared access, trust and concern. It31assumes, absent explicit proof
to the contrary, that people do not share.
While pursuing the formalism of standing requirements the courts appear
unconcerned that the appearance of justice is sorely lacking. The height of
judicial insensitivity to the appearance of justice appeared in a case in which
the court allowed the police to rely upon information brutally extracted
27 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
28

29

30

31

In Payner v. U.S., 447 U.S. 727 the police surreptitiously seized a banker's briefcase,
photographed the contents, then used the documents to incriminate the accused.
See, e.g., R. v. Leonard (1987), 27 C.R.R. 128 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); R. v. Guiller (1987), 25 C.R.R.
273 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
Re Church of Scientology and the Queen (1985), 12 C.R.R. 257 (Ont. H.C.); R. v. Leaney
(1987), 38 C.C.C. (3d) 263 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Cloutare and Tabah (1986), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 271
(Que. C.A.); Model Power v. R. (1981), 21 C.R. (3d) 195 (Ont. C.A.).
M. Coombs, "Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships"
(1988) 75 Calif. L.Rev. 1592 at 1631.
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during a violent interrogation.3 2 The violence was not employed against the
accused and he had no right to complain about the mistreatment of others.
Adversarial justice is obsessed with limiting judicial intervention to the
personal claims of those people who are ordered to appear in court. Members
of the public are not allowed to intervene in or commence a prosecution
against the wishes of the state,3 3 and an accused person is similarly denied the
opportunity to advance the claims of others in her defence. There is a certain
logical symmetry in denying public participation on the side of both the
prosecutor and the defence, but one must question the wisdom of silencing the
community voice in the administration of justice in an area of law that
purports to serve the public interest.
B. INVESTIGATION
When one thinks of a criminal investigation, the common perception is that
of the detective probing, inquiring, and conducting forensic tests in an attempt
to make all the pieces fit the puzzle. In fact a large part of an investigation
revolves around securing the consent of citizens to provide information and
material. Law enforcement would suffer immensely if citizens withdrew their
cooperation. In any investigation, however, the cooperative citizen may
become an accused and then the cooperation exhibited by the citizen becomes
a waiver or forfeiture of the rights attendant upon being an accused.
The Charterof Rights protects us from unreasonable searches and seizures.
This right is designed to provide us with a reasonable expectation of privacy,
but this right is by no means absolute. It may be overridden by a superior state
interest. The balancing formula is simple: "the state's interest in detecting and
preventing crime begins to prevail over the individual's interest in being left
alone at a point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion". 34 To
ensure that state officials interfere only when a credibly-based probability of
crime has been reached we have interposed the requirement of a warrant. A
search is presumptively unreasonable if it has not been previously authorized
35
by a neutral arbiter.
This relatively simple approach is abandoned in its entirety if a citizen
consents to being searched. In fact, one of the most prevalent modes of
32

People v. Portelli,205 N.E. (2d) 857 (1965).

33 See, e.g., Re Hamilton v. The Queen (1986), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (B.C. S.C.); Campbellv. A.G.

of Ontario (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. H.C.); Re Baker andthe Queen (1986), 26 C.C.C.
(3d) 123 (B.C. S.C.).

34 See Hunter, supra, note 10.

35 Following the lead of Hunter, supra, note 10, other cases have established this modified

warrantper se model. See R. v. Debot (1981), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Collins
(1987), 56 C.R. (3d) (S.C.C.).
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conducting searches is upon consent, 36 and once consent is obtained the
safeguards of the Constitution are inapplicable because the transaction is
apparently transformed into a private affair.3 7 Despite the prevalence of
consent searches few jurists question the legitimacy of consenting to
unreasonable searches. In the early days of the Charter some lower courts
criticized the juridical significance of consent:
A search is either unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter or it is not and the
fact that an accused consented to it is irrelevant. In my opinion, an
accused 38cannot "consent" to an infringement of his rights under the
Charter.
The view that one cannot consent to a constitutional violation was short-lived,
39
and courts now readily accept the validity of a consent search.
The United States Supreme Court gave some indication as to why this
practice is permitted. 40 They suggested that the practice was justified because
(i) the consent search may not be more invasive than a search by warrant; (ii)
the Constitution should not discourage citizens from aiding in the investigation of crime; (iii) the police need a mechanism for investigating a suspicion of
illicit activity that has not crystallized into probable cause; and (iv) the citizen
will benefit from the consent because a fruitless consent search will allow the
citizen to avoid arrest or further detention. In addition to these pragmatic
considerations the court was also of the view that "[c]onsent searches are
permitted, not because such an exception to the requirements of probable
cause and warrant is essential to proper law enforcement ,,but because we
permit our citizens to choose whether or not they wish to exercise their
constitutional rights." 4'
When the consent search is seen as another manifestation of waiver the
court has little difficulty justifying it because "the law of waiver is.. .largely
unconcerned with the substantive question of what can be waived and what
not; rather the tenor of the law is to elaborate second-order procedures for
valid renunciation of rights". 42 Once defined as waiver the second-order
36

See, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Police Powers - Search and Seizure in Criminal

Law Enforcement (Ottawa: The Commission, 1983) at 81-83 and 89-90.
Ibid. at 52.
38 R. v. Heisler (1983), 7 C.R.R. I at 9 (Alta. Prov. Ct.).
39 Most of the reported cases have found that the consent was obtained invalidly; however, the
courts never question the validity of attempting to secure consent, see, e.g., R.,v. Woodward
(1984), 6 C. R.R. 130 (Ont. Co. Ct); R. v. Pulfer (1984), 37 Sask. R. 254 (Sask. Prov. Ct); R. v.
Kenyon (1986), 53 C.R. (3d) 249 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); R. v. Squires (1987), 22 C.R.R. 260 (Ont.
37

Prov. Ct.); R. v. Meyers (1987), 58 C.R. (3d) 176 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter Meyers]; R. v.
Kaplinowski (1987), 26 C.R.R. 154 (B.C. C.A.).
40 Schneckloth v. Bustamome, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) [hereinafter Schneckloth].
4' Ibid. at 283.
41 Damaska, supra, note 12 at 99.
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procedures fall neatly into place. A waiver is commonly defined as "an
43
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege",
and, accordingly, a valid waiver requires a conscious choice that is both
informed and voluntary. However, courts have been reluctant to apply the
logic of waiver in requiring that the consenting party be aware of her right to
refuse.
In 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim that the consenting party
must be informed of her right to refuse entry and the search. 44 The court held
that knowledge of one's right is only one factor to take into account in
determining whether the citizen voluntarily consented. The court assumed
that requiring the police to notify the citizen of her rights was an impracticality, because consent searches are informal interactions that "are a far cry
from the structured atmosphere of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he
chooses, a defendant is informed of his trial rights". 45 In effect the court held
that the standard of a knowing and intelligent waiver only applies to rights
needed to preserve a fair trial, and that the relinquishment of the non-trial
right of privacy may be made in ignorance. As long as the consent is voluntary
in the sense of being free from coercion, the constitutional safeguards are
happily abandoned.
The Canadian situation roughly parallels the American doctrine. In a
non-constitutional context the Supreme Court of Canada noted that it is
misleading to believe that any citizen/police interaction could be characterized as voluntary if the citizen is not informed of her options. 46 Despite this
insightful comment most Canadian courts readily find valid consent even
when the consenter is not fully informed. 47 The relevant standard is that the
consent be free from coercion, and even when a court indicates that it will
require that the consenter be fully informed, the standard will be met by a
veiled threat from an officer that if the right of refusal is exercised then a
warrant will be obtained. 48 It is not surprising that police officers rely so

43 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 at 464 (1938).
4

Schneckloth, supra, note 40.

45 Ibid. at 232.
46 In R. v. Dedman (1985), 46 C. R. (3d) 193, the court would not consider that compliance with a

R.I.D.E. spotcheck was a voluntary stop. Ledain J. stated (at 215) "a person should not be
prevented from invoking a lack of statutory or common law authority for a police demand or
direction by reason of compliance with it in the absence of a clear indication from the police
officer that the person is free to refuse to comply. Because of the intimidating nature of police
action and uncertainty as to the extent of police powers, compliance in such circumstances
cannot be regarded as voluntary in any meaningful sense."
47 The majority of cases cited at note 39 found consent to be invalid not for reasons of lack of
information about the individual's options, but because of intimidation and coercion. Only
one of the cases cited, Meyers, even mentioned knowledge of a right to refuse as being
relevant.
48 See Meyers, supra, note 39.
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heavily on consent searches given that the courts have eliminated the knowing
and intelligent portion of the standard employed for most other waivers.
In addition, the modern technological counterpart of the physical search,
electronic surveillance, employs consent as an integral part of its empowering
scheme.4 9 A wiretap can be obtained upon authorization, but absent judicial
authorization, any evidence obtained by an unauthorized tap will still be
admitted into evidence if one of the participants to the conversation consents
to either the interception or the admission of the evidence. For both the
physical and electronic search, the law contemplates the unauthorized
obtaining of evidence by virtue of third party consent. 50
In 1979 the Supreme Court of Canada approved of intercepting communications based upon the presence of third party consent; however, they
expressed some sympathy for the problem of the "unilateral destruction of
any such right by one party to a protected conversation".'
Despite the
expression of sympathy the court felt bound by the clear intention of
Parliament. Parliament had ordained that the autonomy interest of a nonparty is of greater importance than the autonomy interest of the accused.
When the Charter lifted the constraining force of Parliamentary
supremacy, this did not convert the court's sympathies into action. Constitutional challenges to the practice of consent wiretaps have been unsuccessful. 52 The comparative perspective illustrates that consent wiretaps
may be more difficult to justify than consent searches. European countries
have frowned upon heavy reliance on electronic surveillance, and German
courts have declared consent wiretaps to be unconstitutional. 53 The German
constitution guarantees the right to develop one's personality, and the courts
have concluded that allowing one participant to a private communication to
unilaterally decide to reveal the contents of the conversation would unduly
54
stunt the growth of the personality of the nonconsenting participant.

49 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, Chap. C-34, ss. 178.11, 178.16.

The previous discussion of consent searches focused only upon consent given by the targeted
individual. Third-party consent to search has not yet become a major issue in Canadian
caselaw, but it is a significant feature of American Fourth Amendment doctrine, see
discussion in M. Gardiner, "Consent as a Bar to Fourth Amendment Scope - A Critique of a
Common Theory" (1980) 71 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 443; Coombs, supra, note 31 at
1642-1650; P. Goldberger, "Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of Searches
in the Fourth Amendment" (1984) 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 319.
51 Rosen v. R., [1980] I S.C.R. 961 at 975.
52 R. v. Sanelli(1987),60 C.R. (3d) 142 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Sanelli]; R. v. Wiggins, (1988),
42 C.C.C.(3d) 303 (B.C.C.A.); for a contrary decision see R. v. Bilodeau (1987), 3 W.C.B. (2d)
104 (B.C. Dist. Ct.).
53 See discussion in Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany and Italy" (1985), 9
Hastings Intl & Comp. L. Rev. 2,37-50; Carr, "Wiretapping in West Germany"(1981) 29 Am.
J. Comp. L. 6Q7.
54 Carr, supra, note 53 at 640.
50
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Canadian and American courts have not adopted a similar view. In
Germany the court does not dwell upon the legality of the police officer's
conduct-the exclusionary rule does not operate to deter official misconduct.
It can only be employed if official conduct or misconduct unduly burdens an
individual's constitutional rights. This mild balancing does not lead to much
exclusion, but it does provide greater protection to aspects of social life that
are considered to be integral to the free development of the personality of the
individual. On the other hand, Canadian and American courts are more
concerned with police illegality. An exercise of official power is not illegal if it
is authorized, and consent interceptions have been duly authorized by
legislation.
All countries have relied upon use of police informants and spies, but North
American law enforcement has grown to be heavily dependent upon
bargaining with co-accused individuals. Many successful undercover operations revolve around betrayal by co-conspirators. Unilateral consents have
become commonplace in our law enforcement because prosecutorial discretion allows the state to secure or induce consent with the carrot of immunity or
a related benefit that is part of a plea bargain. The European experience shows
a distaste for extensive prosecutorial discretion, so plea bargaining and
official grants of immunity are not commonplace.5 5 The system is premised
upon compulsory prosecution, 56 and an incidental by-product is the absence
of betrayed loyalties from acquaintances, friends, and business partners who
have been tempted by an excellent deal offered by the state.
To facilitate investigation by betrayal, American and Canadian courts have
construed the constitutional right to privacy in a manner in which it may be
easily forfeited. To establish a claim that an investigatory practice violates our
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures the claimant
must meet a twofold requirement: "first, that a person had exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation was one
that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable". 57 A consideration of the
cases reveals that the subjective component operates as a forfeiture of rightsif the claimant has conducted herself in a manner that is inconsistent with the

55 See Damaska, "The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a German Mono-

graph" (1981) 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 119, 129; Volkman-Schluck, "Continental European
Criminal Procedures: True or Illusive Model"(1981) Am. J. Comp. L. I.
56 There is a debate as to the extent to which the principle of legality and compulsory prosecution
is truly a part of European practice. For an introduction to the debate, see Goldstein and
Marcus, "The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial' Systems: France, Italy and
Germany"(1977) 87 Yale L.J. 240; Langbein and Weinrib, "Continental Criminal Procedure:
'Myth' and Reality" (1978) 87 Yale L.J. 1549; Langbein, "Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion in Germany" (1974) 41 U. Chi. L.Rev. 439.
57 R. v. Wong (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 352 at 362 (Ont. C.A.).
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assertion of a right to privacy then she becomes disentitled from subsequently
58
asserting the right in a trial context.
This implicit forfeiture of rights is the foundation for the conclusion that
consent wiretaps are constitutional. Both the American and Canadian courts
reasoned that when one converses with another there is an assumption of risk
that one of the participants may reveal the content of the conversation. 59 The
courts define a conversation as a "voluntarily shared exchange which contains
an assumed risk of its repetition".60 In other words, one can only safeguard
privacy by refusing to converse, so that breaking the cone of silence is
construed as conduct inconsistent with a desire to assert one's right. There is
no fear that this doctrine of assumption of risk may chill the exercise of free
speech (or the development of the personality) because "it is only those whose
conversations are concerned with various illegal activities who will be
6
seriously concerned about the possibility of their remarks being recorded". '
This last comment confirms that the reasonable expectation of privacy test
operates as a form of forfeiture by misconduct. By focusing on the illegal
nature of the transaction the court is saying in effect that the misconduct
disentitles the rights-bearer from claiming the right. Although some judges
have recognized that the relevant inquiry should not be "on the risks an
individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third
parties, but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open
society", 62 the courts have continually focused upon the subjective component
of the privacy test to arrive at the conclusion that one engaged in criminal
activity has become disentitled from claiming one's rights. It is this judicial
approach that explains the surprising conclusions that one does not have any
privacy interest when one walks on the street or when one uses a public
63
washroom.
In this area of the law, the courts have construed the constitutional
safeguards so that they do not automatically protect the intended beneficiary,
but rather as requiring the prior condition that there be an active assertion of
the right. In discussing the constitutionality of aerial surveillance of an
58 For example, see ibid.; R. v. Lofthouse (1988), 62 C.R. (3d) 157 (Ont . C.A.); R. v. Boivin
(1986), 28 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (Que. C.A.). In all these cases the courts held that a reasonable
expectation of privacy did not exist because the defendants were engaged in criminal activities
with others. The fact that they acted in a secretive manner did not manifest an assertion of
their privacy interest but merely a desire not to be detected. One of the only recent cases in
which the court did not adopt an ad hominem approach to strip an individual of her privacy
right is R. v. Asencious (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 168 (Que. C.A.).
59 U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Sanelli, supra, note 52.
60 Sanelli, supra, note 52 at 152.
61 Ibid. at 151.
62 Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577 at 2585 (1979).
63 Re street, see U, S. v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983). Re washroom, see R. v. Lofthouse, supra,
note 58.
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accused's backyard, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the accused took
"normal precautions to maintain his privacy" by building a ten foot fence, but
this assertion of the right only applied against "normal sidewalk traffic" and
the accused was not "entitled to assume" that "his unlawful conduct will not be
observed by a passing aircraft-or by a power company repair mechanic on a
pole overlooking the yard". 64 This focus upon the activities and conduct of the
rights-claimant stultifies the application of the right. The focus on the
personal nature of the right has rendered s. 8 of the Charter and the Fourth
Amendment powerless:
Anyone can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the cellar,
cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, turning off the lights and
remaining absolutely quiet. This much withdrawal is not required in order
to claim the benefit of the [fourth] amendment, because, if it were, the
amendment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the kind of open
society to which we are committed and in which the amendment is
65
supposed to function.

C. INTERROGATION
If the state is interested not only in seizing personal possessions but is also

interested in the content of one's mind, then the state encounters a difficulty.
The seizure of personal possessions is permitted if the state has a superior
interest in detecting crime that is evidenced by probable cause and supported
by a warrant. To probe an individual's thoughts, it is not sufficient for the state
merely to assert a superior state interest:66 no one can be compelled to speak.
However, although the right to remain silent is absolute, it is not inalienable.
The state may be permitted to probe a speaker's innermost thoughts, but only
if the speaker consents.
The framework for interrogating suspects and accused individuals is clear
and simple. First, the state cannot compel attendance for interrogation unless
it has probable cause to arrest. 67 Absent probable cause, the state can detain
68
an individual for questioning only if it requests her presence and she agrees.
Once she agrees to a request there are no attendant rights save for her absolute
right to remain mute. 69 However, if the state arrests her on probable cause of
Californiav. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 at 1813 (1986).
Amsterdam, "Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment" (1974) 58 Minn. L.Rev. 349 at 402.
66 For an analysis of the distinction between searching personal possessions and probing the
contents of the mind, see Uviller, "Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint" (1987) Colum. L.Rev. 1137,
1145-7.
67 R. v. Duguay (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 140 (Ont. C.A.); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979).
68 R. v. Bazinet (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 273(Ont. C.A.); R. v. Smith (1986),25 C.C.C. (3d) 361
(Ont. C.A.).
69 This is because a voluntary accompaniment to the police station does not constitute detention
under the Charter,and thus no attendant rights are triggered, see cases cited, supra, note 68.
6
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having committed a crime, or if the state demands her presence such that she
reasonably believes she is being detained, then Charter safeguards are
triggered.7 0 Included in the safeguards is the right to retain and instruct
counsel and to be informed of that right (section 10(b) of the Charter).
The right to counsel is not what it appears to be. American and Canadian
courts have not interpreted the right so as to preclude interrogation in the
absence of counsel. What is contemplated by the right is that an individual be
permitted to speak with counsel before answering questions because stationhouse questioning is inherently coercive, and a court cannot be certain that
one has voluntarily agreed to speak unless one has been given the opportunity
to speak with counsel. 71There is never any suggestion that it is improper for an
individual to waive one's right to remain silent, one's right against selfincrimination; rather, the right to be informed of the right to counsel is an
instrumental right that is designed to facilitate the waiver. 72 If the police have
informed a person that she may contact counsel, then a court can rest assured
that any conversations she has with the police subsequent to the warning are a
product of a voluntary choice to speak.
A consistent doctrinal approach to the right to counsel has emerged from
the Canadian case law. First, it is incumbent upon the police to inform an
accused, in language she understands, of her right to contact a lawyer shortly
after she has been arrested or detained. Second, if she asserts her right to
contact a lawyer then the police are disabled from questioning until a
reasonable opportunity to contact counsel has been permitted. 73 However, if
she fails to assert the right by requesting counsel then the interaction will be
evaluated in one of two ways. If there are no exceptional circumstances, such
as shock, drunkenness, or a mental handicap, which would suggest that she is
unable to understand the warning, then any conversation she has with the
police subsequent to the warning will be construed as a waiver of her right to
counsel and her right to remain silent. 74 If there are exceptional circumstances, then her decision to speak will not automatically be construed as a
waiver. 75 The presence of special circumstances poses problems for deterThe reasonable apprehension of detention test emerges from R. v. Therens (1985), 18 C.CC.
(3d) 481 (S.C.C.); R. v. Moran (1987), 21 O.A.C. 257 (Ont. C.A.).
7' The seminal case of Mirandav. State ofArizona, 383 U.S. 1602(1966) [hereinafter Miranda]
is premised upon the inherent coerciveness of station-house interrogation. The famous
Miranda warnings are a judicial attempt to offset this coercive environment.
72 In Miranda,ibid. at 470, the court notes that "no effective waiver of the right to counsel during
interrogation can be made unless specifically made after the warnings have been given". That
is, if the warning of the instrumental right has been given then the court will presume
subsequent waivers to be effective and voluntary.
73 These two points emerge clearly from R. v. Manninen (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.); R.
v. Williams (1986), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 48 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Anderson (1984), l0 C.C.C. (3d) 417
(Ont. C.A.).
74 R. v. Baig (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 181 (S.C.C.).
75 R. v. Clarkson (1986), 50 C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Clarkson].
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mining if an individual has waived her rights because the Supreme Court of
Canada has adopted a higher standard for waiver than the voluntary, free
from coercion, standard employed in the consent search scenario. The Court
has held that "an accused must knowingly, intelligently and with a full
76
understanding of the implications, waive his constitutional right to counsel".
The Court established an "awareness of consequences" test that requires the
police to ensure that the incapacitated individual is fully aware of the
consequences of waiving her right. It is not altogether clear what type of
information the police must provide beyond the elliptical and clear warning
that an individual has a right to retain and instruct counsel, but it appears that
the police may have to elaborate upon the right to remain silent and the fact
that a decision to speak means that an accused's words can be used against her
in a court of law.
The defining feature of the right to counsel is not a requirement that counsel
be present, but rather is an examination of the circumstances of the encounter
to determine if the individual in not asserting the right has knowingly waived
it. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently concluded that the pre-trial right to
counsel is not to "mold police conduct" or "mandate a code of behaviour for
state officials" but is rather a personal right granted to an accused to guard
against a coercive abridgement of the right against self-incrimination. 77
If it is a personal right, the only relevant inquiry is whether the accused
understood the nature of the right and the consequences of abandoning it.
Accordingly, the Court held that the actions of the police in deceiving the
accused's attorney, by informing her that it was unnecessary to attend at the
station because no interrogation was to take place, could not affect the
validity of the accused's waiver. In addition the police failed to inform the
accused that his attorney desired to speak with him. The impropriety of the
police deception was not of juridical significance in assessing the exercise of
the personal right of the accused. The court held:
No doubt the additional information would have been useful to
respondent; perhaps it might have affected his decision to confess. But we
have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a
suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate
his self-interest in
deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights. 78
The essence of the right is choice and it is of little consequence to the state if
rights-bearers consistently act to their detriment, even if the cause of the harm
is partially attributable to the actions of state officials.

76

Ibid. at 302.

77 Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
78

Ibid. at 1142.
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D. TRIAL AND APPEAL
There are many different facets of the trial process that can be waived or
forfeited. Some elements of trial process are so obviously related to forensic
strategy that it is senseless to approach them as waivers of rights. For example,
we speak of a right to cross-examine witnesses, and, in fact, this is a claimright that will warrant appellate relief if the opportunity to exercise the right is
denied;7 9 however, this right can be exercised or forgone according to the
strategy of the defence. Very few people would question the propriety of
allowing a waiver of this right. Accordingly, some trial rights will be exempt
from the following analysis. We will return to these accepted instances of
waiver later in the paper when we attempt to distinguish between rights that
are properly subject to waiver and rights that are inalienable.
In 1982 the Supreme Court of Canada noted that some procedural
safeguards that apply at trial are waivable and others are not. They drew the
distinction as follows:
Some procedural safeguards are enacted for the protection of the rights of
one of the parties, Crown and accused, and others for both. A party may
waive a procedural safeguard enacted for his benefit, the concurrence of
both being required when enacted for both.... Paramount to such a right is
that of a trial judge to require compliance notwithstanding a desire to
waive, he being the ultimate judge of what procedural safeguards need
nevertheless be respected
in order to protect the certainty and the integrity
0
of the trial process.8
Despite this pronouncement there is no judicial barometer to measure when
a right has been enacted solely for the benefit of the accused, and when a right
has been enacted for both accused and Crown. The substantive question of
which rights are waivable may be unclear. The Supreme Court, however, was
quite clear on the standard to be employed to measure the validity of a
purported waiver of rights at trial:
...any waiver is dependent upon it being clear and unequivocal that the
person is waiving the procedural safeguard and is doing so with full
knowledge of the rights the procedure was enacted to protect and of the
8
effect the waiver will have on those rights in the process. '

It is important to note at the outset of an examination of the various
procedural safeguards applicable at trial that adversarial justice allows the
accused to choose his or her mode of trial.8 2 The Charterguarantees a right to
79 It is a denial of natural justice to deny the opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine.
See, e.g., Re Durette (1979), 47 C.C.C. (2d) 170 (Ont. H.C.).
80 Korponay v. Attorney General of Canada, [1982] I S.C.R. 41 at 48.
s1 Ibid. at 49.
82

This choice is codified in the election and re-election provisions of the CriminalCode - ss. 464,
490-495.
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trial by jury for offences punishable by five years or more (s. 1l(f)). However,
the accused need not elect to be tried in this manner. For most offences, the
accused is furnished with a choice of trial by provincial court judge, trial by
judge alone, or trial byjudge and jury. This choice or election does not violate
83
the right to trial byjury because it is considered a valid instance of waiver. If
the offence is murder then an election for a non-jury trial must be supported
84
by the concurrence of the Crown and is subject to the approval of the court.
For whatever reason, Parliament has deemed that ajury trial for the offence of
murder is a procedural safeguard that was enacted for the benefit of both
Crown and accused. Notwithstanding the obvious seriousness of the charge, it
is unclear why ajury trial is a benefit to both parties only in this circumstance.
Parliament has recognized that the accused's choice of mode of trial must be
restricted, and the Criminal Code allows the Attorney General to force the
accused to be tried by a jury.85 This restriction on choice does not violate the
Charter, and the Attorney General may act without giving any reasons or
affording the accused an opportunity to protest.8 6 In effect, it has been
recognized that the trial process affects interests other than those of the
accused, but there has been no attempt made to articulate when these interests
are activated.
Similar confusion surrounds the right of the accused to attend his or her
trial. Section 577 of the CriminalCode requires that the accused be present
throughout the trial. This is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be
waived by an accused who decides that his presence is not necessarily an
advantage. 87 However, an accused may choose not to attend his preliminary
inquiry, but this absence needs the concurrence of the prosecutor because it
has been held that attendance is for the benefit of both the Crown and the
accused.88 It is unclear why attendance at the preliminary is waivable with
Crown concurrence but attendance at trial is not. Presumably, trial attendance is not waivable because the personal presence of the accused satisfies a
public interest in the appearance of justice. Why this interest is absent at the
preliminary is not clearly articulated. It cannot be argued that waiver by
concurrence is acceptable at the preliminary hearing because this requirement
is not a matter of public interest but rather is only a safeguard enacted for the
benefit of both accused and the prosecutor as litigant. The Ontario Court of
Appeal has held that "the Crown Attorney does not participate in a criminal
trial as an 'individual'. He participates as a representative of the Crown, which
83

R. v. McGann; R. v. Charters (1986), 16 W.C.B. 260 (N.B. Q.B.).

84 See section 430 of the Criminal Code; R. v. Ettinger (1986), 17 W.C.B. 362 (N.S. C.A.).

85S. 498 of the Criminal Code.

86 R. v. Musitano (1983), 2 C.R.R. 324 (Ont. H.C.).
87 R. v. Dunbar and Logam (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 12 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Dumont (1984), 37 C.R.

(3d) 399 (Sask. C.A.); but see also R. v. Belrose (1987), 17 W.C.B. 276 (B.C. C.A.).
88 Re McLaughlan (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 256 (Ont. C.A.).
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in turn represents the state, i.e. organized society." 89 Therefore, one cannot
distinguish between rights that are waivable, non-waivable, and waivable with
concurrence on the basis of the interests of the Crown as litigant. Reference
must be made to the collective public interest, yet it is impossible to develop a
criterion for establishing when the public is interested or when it is indifferent.
The fundamental right to be present illustrates that non-waivable rights
may still be lost through forfeiture. The United States Supreme Court found
that it is constitutional to bind, gag or exclude an obstreperous defendant, 90
and it justified this practice as an incident of waiver:
Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against the loss of constitutional rights..., we explicitly hold today that a
defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been
warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive
behaviour, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so
disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot
be carried on with him in the courtroom. 9'
The U.S. Supreme Court appears to conflate waiver with forfeiture and the
failure to distinguish the two can lead to confusion. It must be understood that
"the significant difference between waiver and forfeiture is that a defendant
can forfeit his defences without having made a deliberate and informed
decision to relinquish them, and without having been in a position to make a
cost-free decision to assert them. Unlike waiver, forfeiture occurs by
operation of law without regard to the defendant's state of mind." 92 In
assessing the validity of waiver, the focus is on the knowledge and
understanding of the accused, whereas the constitutional validity of forfeiture
depends upon whether the deemed abandonment of the right is an appropriate
and proportionate response to the defendant's misconduct.
In the Canadian context, the Criminal Code allows a judge to conduct a
trial in the absence of the accused if the accused absconds during the
proceedings. 93 The Code states that the accused shall "be deemed to have
waived his right to be present at his trial". The Ontario Court of Appeal
upheld this provision as constitutional on the basis that absconding constitutes a waiver of the right to be present. 94 Despite the reference to waiver, it is

9 R. v. Stoddart (1987), 59 C.R. (3d) 134 at 146 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Stoddart].
90 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
9' Ibid. at 343.
92 Westen, "Away From Waiver: A Rationale For The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Procedure" (1977) 75 Mich. L.Rev. 1214.
93 Section 43 1.
I(I)(a) of the Criminal Code.
94 R. v. Czuczman (1986), 49 C.R. (3d) 384 (Ont. C.A.): R. v. Tzimopolous (1986), 29 C.CC.
(3d) 304 (Ont. C.A.).
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clear that the court was aware that this provision was in fact an instance of
forfeiture by operation of law. It appeared to be aware of the necessity to find
that the forfeiture was a proportionate response to the misconduct when it
indicated that the right to be present is not an absolute right and must "be
measured against the corresponding rights of others and of society in the due
administration of justice". 95
An accused who absconds stands not only to lose the right to be present but,
by operation of law, he is disentitled from having a trial by jury upon his
return to the jurisdiction. 96 The Ontario Court of Appeal held that this
particular practice was unconstitutional. 97 The Court praised the institution
of trial by jury and commented that:
[H]istory demonstrates that the right of trial by jury not only is an
essential part of our criminal justice system but also is an important
constitutional guarantee of the rights of the individual in democratic
society. In all common law countries it has, for this reason, been treated
almost sacrosanct and has been interfered with only to a minimal extent. 98
This glowing praise might lead one to believe that trial by judge and jury is
such an integral part of the criminal justice system that there is a public
interest in not allowing accused individuals to waive the safeguard. But, the
court construed the right as a choice "given to an accused which prevails
unless he or she chooses not to utilize it by electing another mode of trial". 99
Accordingly, waiver of the right is permitted. Forfeiture, however, is not
allowed-the court simply concluded that "Charter rights cannot be destroyed
in this fashion".10 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that a forfeiture of
constitutional rights may be a reasonable limitation upon rights as contemplated by section 1 of the Charter. In this case it was held that there was no
evidence that the forfeiture was necessary to achieve the compelling state
objective in the administration of judicial interim release. Other appellate
courts have struck the balance differently and have held that forfeiture is a
proportionate response because the absconding accused is not entitled to
impose an obligation upon the state to empanel a jury a second time, unless he
can provide a reasonable excuse for unnecessarily putting the state to the time
and expense the first time around.10 1

95 Czuzman, supra, note 94 at 388.
96 Section 526.1 of the Criminal Code.
97 R. v. Bryant (1984), 42 C.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. C.A.).
98 Ibid. at 332.
99 Ibid. at 322.
100Ibid. at 323.
101R. v. Crate(1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 127 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter Crate]; R. v. McNabb (1986), 55
C.R. (3d) 369 (B.C. C.A.).
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The state need not only provide you with a jury if so requested, but it must
ensure that you are brought to trial within a reasonable time. The Charterof
Rights guarantees a trial within a reasonable time (s.l1(b)), but early
jurisprudence suggested that one is only entitled to the right if one asserts it. 102
A requirement of assertion operates as a waiver by omission, that is, if the
individual fails to make a claim then the right is lost. As indicated in the
introduction, the Supreme Court of Canada in Millso3 held that this right is a
personal right that does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Consistent
with the view that the right is personal, the Court held that the right is subject
to waiver; however, they converted the waiver from one of omission to an
active and informed relinquishment of the right. A waiver cannot be inferred
from silence or from the omission to assert the right in a timely fashion. The
waiver must be clear and unequivocal and articulated with full knowledge of
10 4
the right and the effect waiver will have on the right.
The impact of waiver is clear: "delay which is requested, caused by, or
consented to, by the accused should normally be excluded from consideration
when assessing the reasonableness of the overall period of the delay". 05 If the
time period is unreasonable, after having excluded delay that has been
consented to by the accused, then the court must stay the proceedings.10 6 In
light of the drastic nature of the remedy, it appears that courts will scrutinize
the record in an attempt to find any defence concession that can be construed
as waiver. The following ambiguous exchange is an example of the attempt of
the courts to fit the interaction into the framework of an informed waiver:
THE COURT: All right. September date?
MR. BARHYDT: I'm free.
MR. RICHARDSON: I wish to confirm that Mr. Bloomenfeld would be
agreeable to that.
MR. MAUBACH: I'm agreeable
MR. BARHYDT: Considering my friend's statements earlier, I can
indicate on behalf of Mr. Morse and myself that we were prepared to
proceed on the fifteenth of this month.
THE COURT: All right.
102R. v. Beason (1983), 36 C.R. (3d) 73 (Ont. C.A.).
103 Supra,

note 4.
104R. v. Heaslip (1983), 36 C.R. (3d) 309 (Ont. C.A.); Mills, supra, note 4 at 544-547.
10' Mills, supra, note 4 at 545.
'06 In Mills, supra, note 4 and Rahey, supra, note 8, a majority of the S.C.C. agreed that a stay of
proceedings was the most appropriate remedy for this type of violation.
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MR. MAUBACH: Likewise, Your Honour, with respect to Mr.
Gugliotta, we were prepared to proceed.
107
THE COURT: All right.

From this exchange the Ontario Court of Appeal was able to find a waiver
that would justify the three year delay in prosecuting charges of extortion and
08
related offenses.
An informed waiver will most likely be found if counsel for an accused
consents to an adjournment. The Supreme Court of Canada has noted that
"where an accused, represented by counsel, has requested, or consented to
delay, waiver of such delay may be deemed clear and unequivocal with full
knowledge of the rights and of the effect the waiver will have on the rights". 09
This is a surprising approach because the courts must surely be aware that
counsel may agree to an adjournment for reasons that have little to do with the
client's appreciation of the right. Adjournments are commonly consented to
because the lawyer is unprepared to commence, the lawyer is double-booked
or the lawyer is prepared to be cooperative with the Crown as an exercise in
good public relations." 0
The role of counsel in the criminal process poses a unique conceptual
problem for the law of waiver. The Charter does not explicitly guarantee a
right to be represented by counsel at trial, but recent case law is moving in the
direction of recognizing a right to state-funded counsel.]" This right is seen as
indispensable in a system that is mystifying to the uninitiated. Despite the
recognition of the key role counsel plays in securing a fair trial, the courts have
also recognized a right to self-representation or, conversely, the right to waive
the right to counsel."1 2 The respect given to a decision to forgo the assistance of
counsel is premised upon the perceived goal of furthering the autonomy of the
defendant:
Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to
defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the state, will
R. v. Askov (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 298 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Askov].
108Contrary to the clear rulings in Mills, supra, note 4, and Rahey, supra,note 8,requiring that a
waiver be clear and unequivocal recent cases seem to be retreating from this position, and as in
the Askov case, ibid., they are scrutinizing the record carefully to see if the accused failed to
assert her right. See R. v. Smith (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 194 (Man. C.A.).
109
Mills, supra, note 4 at 545.
110For a general discussion of the organizational pressures that force defence counsel to sacrifice
the interest of the client for better relations with other court officials, see Blumberg, "The
Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Co-optation of a Professional",
(1966-7) I Law & Soc. Rev. 15.
" See, R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 25 O.A.C. 321 at 363-371 (Ont. C.A.).
112 Faretta v. California,422 U.S. 806 (1975); R. v. Bowles and Danyluk (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d)
540 (Alta. C.A.).
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bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant,
therefore, who must be free to personally decide whether in his particular
case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own
defence ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out
3
of "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law"."
The foundation for the practice of waiver stands on shaky ground. We
respect the defendant's choices to further his sense of dignity and autonomy;
yet, we allow the defendant's choices to be exercised by an advocate even
though we do not take the added precaution of ensuring that the advocate's
exercise of the right is based upon the genuine choices of the defendant. This is
not a problem unique to counsel's consent to an adjournment. The incoherency of the foundation is readily apparent from an examination of attempts by
accused to withdraw guilty pleas and the reluctance of appellate courts to
grant relief based upon errors committed by counsel.
The guilty plea is the most dramatic manifestation of waiver. The panoply
of procedural safeguards at trial can be circumvented by this admission of
guilt. Chief Justice Laskin alluded to the sweeping nature of this waiver:
A plea of guilty carries with it an admission that the accused so pleading
has committed the crime charged and a consent to a conviction being
entered without any trial. The accused by such a plea relieves the Crown
of the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, abandons his
non-compellability as a witness and his right to remain silent4 and
surrenders his right to offer full answer and defence to a charge."
At common law the defendant was not encouraged to avoid trial by
pleading guilty,' 15 and in contemporary practice in Europe a guilty plea is an
unavailable option.' 1 6 In Europe, an accused's confession of guilt is only one
factor to be taken into account by the judge in determining if guilt is proved in
dubio pro reo."I7 The confession of guilt may expedite the trial but a trial is
held nonetheless. Without recourse to the guilty plea, and in light of the
principle of compulsory prosecution, the practice of plea bargaining is
virtually unknown in Europe. 1 8 In Canada, 90% of criminal cases result in
pleas of guilty and it has been noted that "plea bargaining has replaced the
"I Faretta,supra, note 112 at 834.
114 Adgey

v. R., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 426 at 440.
15 Langbein, "Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining" (1979) 13 Law & Soc. Rev.
261 at 264.
116Ibid. at 267; Stepan, "Possible Lessons From Continental Criminal Procedure", in The
Economics of Crime and Punishment (1976) at 189-190.
17 For a discussion of this standard of proof, see Fletcher, "Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A
Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases" (1967-8) 77 Yale
L.J. 880.
18 See discussion in articles cited in notes 55, 56, 115, 116, 239 and 246.
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traditional adversary trial process in the majority of cases dealt with by urban
courts".

119

Plea bargaining has become so entrenched that Crown and defence counsel
feel compelled to adopt this expedient as a major part of their forensic
strategy. The efficiency of the practice is rewarded through a system that
incorporates a sentencing differential: that is, a guilty plea immediately

entitles one to a reduction in the expected sentence. If lawyers are enamoured
of this method of quickly disposing of cases, there is a danger that accused
individuals may be coerced or tricked into playing the game. Courts are
reluctant to entertain this possibility of coercion, and they take comfort in the
approach of the U.S. Supreme Court to a claim of coercion where a defendant
was threatened with an indictment under the Kentucky HabitualCriminalAct
if he did not agree to plead guilty to a charge of uttering. The defendant
refused to play the game and instead of the two to ten year sentence permitted
on a charge of uttering, he received the life sentence required by the habitual
offence statute. The court made the following remarks:
Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the
guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important
components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned.... Plea bargaining flows from the
mutuality of advantage to defendants and prosecutors each with his own
Defendants advised by competent
reasons for wanting to avoid trial....
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively
capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and
unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.... Indeed, acceptance of
the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any
sense simply
notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional
20
because it is the end result of a plea bargain.
Surely there is a public interest in ensuring that accused individuals are only
convicted upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that upon
conviction they receive a sentence that is proportionate to their guilt.
However, this public interest is not considered strong enough to displace the
practice of waiving the trial and allowing the sentence to be determined by a
process of negotiation and not by a conception of just desert. As with other
instances of waiver, the practice seems less objectionable when we insist upon
a standard that the waiver be made knowingly and intelligently. However,
even this legitimating standard is not employed with full force. The Supreme
Court of Canada has approved of the statement that "it cannot be said that
where.. .an accused is represented by counsel and tenders a plea of guilty to
19 The Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A CanadianApproach (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986) at 406.
120Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 at 361-363 (1977).
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non-capital murder, the trialjudge before accepting it is bound, as a matter of
law, to interrogate the accused".1 2' So long as counsel indicates that her client
is willing to plead guilty, the court need not inquire as to whether the client is
fully informed of her rights and the consequences of the plea. Even in the
United States, where there is a statutory duty upon the trial judge to inquire
into the decision to plead guilty,' 22 studies show that the reforms have "left the
23
coercive character of plea bargaining intact".
On appellate review the court is reluctant to allow an individual to
withdraw his or her plea after the individual has had time to deliberate upon
the decision to plead guilty and has decided that the decision was made in
haste. There are some cases in which an appellate court has allowed a
24
withdrawal of the guilty plea upon proof of undue pressure from counsel,
but it must be remembered that the vast majority of accused people do not
apply to have their plea withdrawn. Even those that do apply and submit
affidavits chronicling the pressure exerted by counsel to accept the Crown's
offer may be met with indifference from a court that concludes that "the
appellant has had experience with the courts. It is not suggested that he did not
25
know the nature of the charge or the effect of his plea."'
An accused will not be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea simply because
the expected bargain was not received. A perverse notion of caveat emptor
applies to foreclose the possibility of the accused backing out of a deal that
does not bear fruit. This business of waiving rights is indeed a risky one. The
trial need not accept the joint sentencing submissions of counsel and the
accused is not permitted at this point of revelation to change his mind. 26 In
addition, the Attorney General is permitted to appeal any agreed-upon
sentence because the overriding public interest in just sentencing cannot allow
the state to be bound by the bargaining decision of a mere representative of the
Crown. 27 It is truly mystifying that the public interest in the fitness of a
sentence is not strong enough to oust the practice of waiver through plea
bargaining but is strong enough to allow state repudiation of the negotiated
results of the practice.
The decision as to how to exercise rights is for the most part made by
counsel on behalf of the rights-bearer. We accept these decisions at face value
121

Brosseau v. The Queen, [1969] S.C.R. 181 at 190.

122 Rule I I of the FederalRules of Criminal Procedure.

McDonald, "Judicial Supervision of the Guilty Plea Process: A Study of Six Jurisdictions"
(1987) 70 Judicature 203 at 215.
124 See R. v. Lamoureux (1984), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 101 (Que. C.A.).
125 R. v. Sode (1974), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 329 at 334 (N.S.C.A.). Less egregious examples of appellate
refusal to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea can be found in R. v. Stark (1986), 17 W.C.B. 325
(N.S. C.A.); R. v. Rubenstein (1987), 3 W.C.B. 260 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lennie (1986), 17
W.C.B. 321 (N.W.T. Terr. Ct.).
126 See, e.g., Rubenstein, ibid.
127 R. v. Dubien (1982), 27 C.R. (3d) 378 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Wood (1976), 26 C.C.C. (2d) 100
(Alta. C.A.).
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and rarely does a court inquire whether the rights-bearer was allowed to
participate in the decision. Appellate courts are loath to overturn convictions
on the basis of poor decisions made by counsel. 128 Courts have even gone as
far as to admit that "an accused must surely assume responsibility for the
actions of his own solicitor. To put it another way, I think that the mistake of
the solicitor must be regarded as the mistake of the client."' 29 Appellate courts
will not allow the admission of fresh evidence if they conclude that the lawyer
was not diligent in his failure to acquire this evidence at trial. 30 Accordingly,
appellate courts may invoke the "no miscarriage of justice" proviso and
dismiss an appeal based upon the consideration that counsel did not object to
an error committed at trial. 131 In addition, there is no basis for reversal on
appeal based upon a claim of "ineffective assistance of counsel".' 32 There are
many obstacles facing an accused who is dissatisfied with the decisions made
by counsel as to how to exercise his rights. These obstacles are constructed
despite the evidence indicating that:
Seldom are attempts made to ascertain whether the accused understands.
Given that the accused rarely speaks or is given an opportunity to speak, it
is highly unlikely that a benevolent, well-meaning court would have any
knowledge of the accused's comprehension. Rather than the court
attempting to make the proceedings comprehensible, the onus is on the
accused to inform the court that he does not understand. However, given
the anxiety and stage fright that most accused suffer, this is unlikely.
Carlen documents that even when asked if they understand, accused are
reluctant to say no because they feel powerless, they don't want
to appear
incompetent, and/or they are too nervous to say anything. 33
E. SANCTION
Despite the prevalence of waiver during investigation and at trial, in
sentencing the practice of waiver drops out of the picture. An accused may be
In the United States there is mild appellate review on the grounds of ineffectiveness of counsel;
see Vanburen, "The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Quandary: The Debate Continues"
(1984-5) 18 Akron L.R. 325. However, in Canada, there has not emerged a similar doctrine,
except fora brief reference in R. v. Garolfoli(1988), 27 O.A.C. I (Ont. C.A.). The American
doctrine operates upon a presumption that "counsel's conduct fell within the domain of
professionally reasonable assistance" (at 329).
129 R. v. Behr, [1967] 3 C.C.C. I (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
130 Palmer and Palmer v. R. (1979), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (S.C.C.).
131 See, e.g., R. v. Guenot (1979), 51 C.C.C. (2d) 315 (Ont. C.A.); Imrich v. R. (1977), 34 C.C.C.
(2d) 143 (S.C.C.); R. v. Deol(1981), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 524 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Bowles (1974), 16
C.C.C. (2d) 425 (Ont. C.A.).
132 Vanburen, supra, note 128.
133 Ericson and Baranek, The Ordering of Justice: A Study ofAccused Persons as Dependents in
the Criminal Process (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) at 186. At 189 the authors
claim that "the inability of the accused to comprehend the proceedings was in some cases
partially attributable to the lawyer".
128
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able to negotiate with the Crown over the suggested sentence, but the actual
choice of sentence is completely within the discretion of the court. The Charter
constrains the force of state power to punish by proscribing cruel and unusual
punishments and by proscribing being punished twice for the same offence.
There may be some residual influence of the personal rights model in the
interpretation of these rights. For example, when Gary Gilmore was content
to accept his sentence of death, his mother was denied standing to appeal
because the court refused to recognize not only the concrete injury to
Gilmore's mother but also society's collective interest in "ensuring that state
authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments". 134 However, the
model of personal rights is largely abandoned at the time of imposition of
sentence. I do not believe that anyone has claimed that in the interests of
autonomy one can waive the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.
There are many possible explanations for the abandonment of a conception
of personal rights and the associated practice of waiver at this stage of the
proceedings. One can assert the primacy of the rights attendant at this stage,
or the symbolic importance of prohibiting barbarity even upon consent. These
arguments, however, will be left for discussion later in the paper. The
explanation to be provided at this point relates to the logic of the adversary
system. The key to understanding the practices of waiver, forfeiture through
misconduct, and bargaining over rights that occur prior to conviction is
revealed in this pronouncement of Chief Justice Burger of the U.S. Supreme
Court:
Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of
counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must
be made before and during trial rests with the accused and his attorney.
Any other approach would rewrite the duties of trialjudges and counsel in
our legal system. 35
Adversarial justice is premised upon party presentation of a dispute to a
neutral arbiter. Neutrality is secured not only by the trappings of judicial
independence but by conceiving of the arbiter as a passive umpire. Judges are
instructed to "keep out of the battle" and allow the litigants to conduct their
cases as they wish. One of the explanations for the divergence between
common law reliance upon waiver and Continental rigidity in procedural
forms is that: "in common law systems, the parties (through their counsel)
perform a number of activities that are intrinsic to the office of the judge on
the Continent. Thus, while the waivers and stipulations of Anglo-American
'34
135

Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 at 1019 (1976).
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 510 at 518 (1976).
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litigants mainly affect their own forensic conduct, similar transactions would
136
affect ingrained patterns of judicial behaviour in Europe."'
Upon conviction, the judge is no longer required to maintain her passive
posture, and the litigants are no longer entitled to adopt the procedural forms
that best suit their interests. The fact that procedural safeguards at the stage of
sanction are not waivable forces one to question the justification for the
dispensability of safeguards at the earlier stages of the process. The
passive/active characterization of judicial behaviour is purely explanatory
and is not immutable. 37 In fact, recent trends suggest that judges are
encouraged to become more active at trial by advancing any defences that may
have not been raised by defence and by aiding the unrepresented accused in
conducting her defence. 38 There is a growing recognition that the criminal
process is such an integral part of the enterprise of defining the structure of the
state/citizen relationship that it is no longer proper to allow the litigants to
define the balance and exercise of power.
Liberal ideology has molded adversarial criminal proceedings, and it has
advanced a view of rights that sees the right as a "loaded gun that the
rightholder may shoot at will in his corner of town". 39 The prevalence of
waiver is partially attributable to the liberal preoccupation with selfsufficiency and individuality. In order to offset this "loaded gun" mentality it
is necessary to explore a conception of rights that acknowledges collective
ownership of a right-legal rights that are no longer the individual "trump"
over collective interest, 40 but rather rights that are constitutive of the
structure of state authority over its residents.

III. WAIVER'S SHAKY FOUNDATION
It is hoped that the preceding discussion has demonstrated the prevalence of
waiver and related practices. It must be noted that the discussion did not
identify a uniform doctrine. Rather it identified at least three variations on the
136 Damaska,

supra, note 12 at 101.

137As Lamer J. said in Brouillard v. R. (1985), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at 196 (S.C.C.),"it is clear that

judges are no longer required to be as passive as they once were; to be what I call sphinx
judges". For a general description of the passive/active dichotomy see Damaska, "Structures
of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure" (1975) 84 Yale L.J. 480 at. 523-526.
138 See R. v. Huebschwerlen (1964), 45 C.R. 393 (Y.T. C.A.); R. v. Rolls (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d)
208 (Ont. C.A.).
139 Unger, supra, note 6 at 597.
140 Dworkin speaks of rights as operating to trump the utilitarian concerns of the public interest
in his book, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977). H is perception of rights is
the conventional, liberal vision of possessive individualism and this is revealed at p. 172 where
he states that "rights-based.. theories... place the individual at the center".
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theme: first, the strict standard waiver in which the mental state of the waiving
party is examined to determine her level of understanding and deliberation;
second, the lenient standard waiver which is based upon an objective
assessment of the facts to determine if the interaction was free from coercion;
and third, forfeiture by operation of law in which the prior actions of the
rights-bearer are examined to identify if she is disentitled from claiming her
rights. There is no coherent rationale for discovering when strict standard,
lenient standard, or forfeiture is to apply. This paper, however, will not be
concerned with developing a criterion for applying these varying standards.
Rather, we will define waiver in an all-embracing general manner as "a judicial
finding that an action taken with respect to a particular right represents a
decision not to assert the right",' 4' and with this definition as a starting point
we will attempt to expose the shaky foundation on which the entire practice of
losing rights is balanced.
The notion of waiver has its roots in an economic conception of the
world. 42 Self-interested and rational persons structure their lives as they
choose by entering a marketplace of goods to bargain and negotiate in their
best interests. 143 One need not know anything about Pareto optimality and
transaction costs to know that the economic analysis has no application in a
marketplace for incorporeal goods. The economic conception of law has a
surface attraction when we are debating the distribution of Blackacre or the
proper value of a horse, but when we turn to incorporeal goods like justice,
truth, equality, and freedom there is something deeply disturbing about
allowing one person to determine the value of these goods in a marketplace.
Waiver allows one person to set the price for the purchase of constitutional
rights. The waiving party may be getting something of value, a reduced
sentence or a psychological release by confessing guilt, but we have now
moved into a realm of public interest and we should not be as concerned with
satisfying a party's private interest. The proper orientation is to downplay the
private interest-to realize that the rights preserved in the Charter are not the
personal rights of the accused but the rights of everyone. The mistaken
attribution of personal rights to particular accused persons partially explains
"I' Rubin, "Towards a General Theory of Waiver" (1981) 28 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 478 at 484-5.
142 Economic analysis has been applied to rights-theory (Coleman and Draus, "Rethinking the
Theory of Legal Rights" (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1335) and to the rules of criminal procedure
(Easterbrook, "Criminal Procedure as a Market Theory" (1983) 12 J. of Legal Studies 239).
The economic theories of criminal justice are soundly rejected in this paper; however, an
expanded critique will not be pursued. Simply stated, Easterbrook's view that criminal
procedure "facilitates a market assessment and imposition of the price of crime" (at 330-I) is
rejected as this characterization bears no resemblance to a criminal process that 1, and other
practioners, have worked in.
143 Easterbrook, supra, note 142 at 291, notes that "large groups of people act as if each person is
a rational maximizer of his satisfaction".
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the common public response to the exclusion of evidence or to other
procedural barriers to conviction which the public bemoans as "escaping on a
technicality". It is understandable for a member of the public to feel that a
suspected murderer is not deserving of personal rights, and the presumption
of innocence is far too counter-intuitive to appease this sense of improper
desert.
All this confusion can be avoided by returning to the simple notion that
legal rights are possessed in common. If the right is collective in nature then it
is difficult to justify individual bargaining sessions over the price of justice.
One has to be exceptionally naive to argue that an accused bargaining over his
sense of personal justice has no effect upon other people's sense of personal
justice. One need only speculate over the way in which the establishment of a
proportionate range of sentence is skewed by the deep entrenchment of plea
bargaining to understand how waiver has an impact on persons other than the
parties to the transaction. It is clear that "the fact that we permit a portion of
defendants to waive trial rights by pleading guilty.. .undoubtedly renders it
44
more difficult for any particular defendant to assert his right to trial".
Incorporeal goods cannot be the subject of marketplace valuation. It is not
because everyone has a uniquely subjective perception of the value of
incorporeal goods like justice, but because the presumed rights-bearer is not
really a bearer but a trustee. For the good of the public at large an accused is
not considered the owner of the right but an idle beneficiary. Legal rights are
not personally owned; they are a definition of the personal status of a given
individual when she enters a legal transaction. Once entering the transaction
the rights-bearer can no longer shed her skin. Whether for good or bad, we
have decided that once an individual becomes an accused person it is no longer
the prerogative of the individual to claim or renounce the good that defines
her status in order to satisfy her perceived needs and self-interest.
In the past decade there has emerged a heated debate between those who
seek to revitalize the liberal conception of rights and those who seek to infuse
law with a communal spirit. In trying to escape the isolation of liberalism's
atomistic conception of social organization, we now encounter exotic
reformulations of social and political life based upon "Maines's status
relationships, Tonnie's gemeinschaft, Gluckman's multiplex relationships,
45
and Blau's intrinsic. exchanges".1
The recent and relentless debate currently being staged by academics,
pitting communitarianism against an aging and stale liberal ideology, has
served at least one purpose. There are many who are convinced of the
14

143

Dix, "Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for a More Careful Analysis" (1977) 55 Texas
L.Rev. 193 at 219.
Hamilton and Sanders, "Punishment and the Individual in the United States and Japan"
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shortcomings of liberal thought, 46 yet there are few who wholly embrace the
communitarian vision, because it remains uncertain what exactly the
communitarian would be embracing. The vision of community is not
programmatic and many of its formulations attract skepticism from those
who are not carried away by the nostalgia of a feudal gemeinschaft or the
promise of a caring and sharing utopia.
Nevertheless, there is something emotionally and intellectually satisfying
about remedying the austere individuality of liberal thought with communitarian ideals-a legal structure premised not upon atomism but upon a unity
of human relationships. Concepts such as alienation, reification, or commodification may appear too cerebral to be convincing, but modern culture
appears to confirm that many people experience life in a "compulsively
repeated existential sequence".' 47 Liberal ideology and its accompanying
social structures may be founded "on the self-directing power of the
personality", 48 but the utter subjectivity of pure liberal epistemology has been
unable to fulfill its promise of the power of personality.
If community is to replace individuality as the animating thought behind
social institutions, then it is necessary to begin instantiating the content of
community. Having already established the link between the pervasive
practice of waiver and liberal thought, it is now necessary to undertake the
task of replacing the notion of constitutional rights as property rights with a
vision of collective or communal rights. A communal or collective right is not
an unknown entity in the history of the common law. It was present in past
common law rules prohibiting the waiver of the sparse grant of rights
accorded our ancestral criminal defendants, 49 and it has recently re-emerged,
in the face of substantial opposition, in labour law.1 50 This notion of a
collective right is a simple direction to the arbiter of any dispute over rights to
take into consideration the impact any decision may have on the interests of
persons other than the individual litigants. Put simply, "an individual who
Kare has stated that "in particular, liberal political theory does not possess a coherent
theory of rights" in "Critical Labour Law Theory: A Comment" (1981) 4 Industrial Rel. L.J.
450 at 468. The critique of liberal rights has come from all perspectives: critical legal studies,
e.g., Kennedy, "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries" (1979) 28 Buffalo L.Rev. 205;
feminist, Olsen, "Statutory Rape: A Feminist's Critique of Rights" (1984) 63 Texas L.Rev.
387; and socialist, Campbell, The Left on Rights: A Conceptual Analysis of the Idea of
Socialist Rights (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1983).
147 Gabel, "The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves"
(1983-4) 62 Texas L.Rev. 1563 at 1568. The repeated existential sequence is comprised of
"desire for connection - memory of loss - anxiety - self-falsification" (at 1568).
148 L. Hobhouse, Liberalism (New York: H. Holt, 1911) at 123.
149 See Dix, supra, note 144 at 217-8.
150See Lynd, "Communal Rights" (1983-4) 62 Texas L.Rev. 1417; Klare, supra, note 146. Again,
it must be noted that the collective right has emerged in areas of language and aboriginal
rights; however, this paper will not discuss these types of collective rights that attach to
definable groups.
146 Karl
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sought to exercise a right that has been categorized as communal might be told
that the right was not his or hers to exercise, for it was vested only in some
5
group or collective representative, or in society at large".' '
A defining feature of a collective right is its inalienability and its rejection of
waiver doctrines. The direction to an arbiter to take into account a collective
interest in rights adjudication is not startling-most judges would claim that
they already take into consideration the "public interest", however narrowly it
may be defined. What is startling is the disabling of the rights-bearer from
exercising the right as he or she might desire.
Restriction of an individual's exercise of a right, even when it originates in
the good intentions of a paternalistic state, is alien to our legal culture. The
sophisticated liberal need no longer espouse the infinite worth of the
individual to justify the retention of personal, contractarian rights. One need
only point to the dangers of submerging the individual to the power of the
group, however worthy the end may be, in order to support the claim that it is
necessary to retain individually-exercised rights that are precisely designed to
offset domination by a powerful group. This fear is what makes one hesitant
to embrace collective rights with their accompanying rigidity of non-waiver.
But it turns out that collective, non-waivable rights are not so foreign in
actual practice. In private law, presumably the bastion of liberal worship of
the primacy of the individual, there are growing instances of non-waiver of
legal rights. Rules relating to employment standards and rules relating to the
avoidance of unconscionable contracts all question the individual's ability to
consent to the temporary abandonment of legal rights. 52 With the emergence
of the welfare state there came recognition that individuals meeting in the
market place did not stand on equal footing, and it was necessary to protect
less-endowed individuals with inalienable rights that could not be appropriated by the powerful through claims of legitimate consent.
Most non-waivable statutory rights that are of recent vintage are premised
upon two related concepts. First, there is the ubiquitous reference to a "public
interest" which may or may not be related to a communal or collective
interest. 53 The public interest relates to the desire to ensure uniformity of
public policy. A stated goal of guaranteeing a minimum wage for workers
would be thwarted if a given worker could opt out of the protection. One need
151 Lynd, ibid.at 1422.

Numerous statutory rights now have a built-in non-waivability clause, see Consumer
ProtectionAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 87, s. 34(2); Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980,c. 137,
ss. 3 & 4; Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 321, s.2(2); Landlordand
Tenant Act, R.S.O., c. 232, s. 82(l).
153 The public interest may not approximate a collective interest or residents because public
interest argument extends to state interests. For example, the creation of offences of strict
liability is premised upon a notion of public interest; however, this interest may be nothing
more than the interest of the state in efficient regulatory compliance.
152
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only think of the exploitation at the turn of the century of immigrant workers
who would work for wages far below what residents would expect. This image
is at once the epitome of free market competition and a violent image of
domination. Therefore, the free market had to be restricted so that certain
bargains would not be respected in any circumstances. The universality of the
program was a vital aspect of the program's success.
Not only does a "public interest" require universal, non-waivable application, but there is a second related factor. If the occurrence of opting-out or
waiving is predictably low, then the public interest may not be so reliant upon
universality. However, in areas governed by non-waivable statutory rights, we
may presume that the parties do not have equal bargaining strength.
Therefore, because the stronger party will know that he can easily secure
consent from a party that really has no other options, we cannot assume a
predictably low occurrence of waiver. In other words, a discretionary claimright will be transformed into a mandatory immunity-right 54 when the public
interest demands universality of application and when the structure of private
relationships is such that one would always second-guess the voluntary and
informed nature of consent.
Presumably, any discussion of a skewed balance of advantage and a public
interest would direct one's attention to the criminal process. This is an area of
law that has been commonly characterized as pitting the awesome power of
the state against an individual who is poorly-equipped for battle.155 Surprisingly, this is one area of law which has not been rigorously subjected to a
critique of personal, waivable rights. It is necessary now to examine the
reasoning that has been employed to retain waivable rights in the constitutional context while more and more statutory rights are being elevated to the
status of inalienable rights.
The shaping of practice by an underlying ideology is rarely a self-conscious
undertaking. For an ideology to be effective it must become so inculcated in
the believer that it appears natural and beyond question. Accordingly, it is
difficult to find examples in legal practice of explicit attempts to justify the
ideology of personal rights and waiver. Fortunately, the celebrated right to
trial by jury presents an opportunity for analysis because at common law this
right was considered non-waivable. Therefore, it was necessary for courts to
make some attempt tojustify the transition of this right to its current waivable
status.
In 1930, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the claim that a conviction
could not be upheld when it was entered by a jury of eleven instead of twelve.
In Patton v. U.S.156 a trial proceeded with eleven jurors due to one juror
See discussion of mandatory right, infra, note 212.
See supra, note II.
156 281 U.S. 276 (1930) [hereinafter Patton].
154
155
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becoming incapacitated. The accused consented to this modified jury, but on
appeal he complained that his consent was inconsequential as the right to trial
by jury was not a right that was waivable at his pleasure. The court accepted
that consenting to an improperly constituted jury was tantamount to waiver
of the entire right, but it upheld the practice of waiving the full operation of the
right.
Much of the case dealt with arguments about the history of the Sixth
Amendment and the original intent of the framers of the American
constitution. However, the court went far beyond justifying waiver by this
elusive search for original intent. The court recognized that the common law
prohibited waiver of trial byjury, but it considered this common law doctrine
a reflection of the savagery of earlier criminal process:
The ancient doctrine that the accused could waive nothing was unquestionably founded upon the anxiety of the courts to see that no
innocent man should be convicted. It arose in those days when the
accused could not testify in his own behalf, was not furnished counsel, and
was punished, if convicted, by the death penalty or some other grievous
punishment out of all proportion to the gravity of his crime. Under such
circumstances it was well, perhaps, that such a rule should exist, and well
that every technical requirement should be insisted on, when the state
demands its meed of blood.... Thanks to the humane
policy of the modern
57
criminal law we have changed these conditions.
Surely, it is a weak argument to claim that a right is inalienable when times
are tough, and expendable when times are better. Presumably, a right exists as
an anchor that remains fixed and does not shift with the vagaries of the
evolution of social institutions. If the jury was considered a valuable factfinding institution when the system meted out roughjustice then surely it must
still possess this value in modern times. In any event, I doubt that many would
be convinced that our modern process has reached a level of perfection that
obviates the need for a protected right to a jury trial.
However, there is another facet to the common law rule that warrants
examination. The court noted that historically a conviction had an adverse
impact upon other people in addition to the accused. A right of waiver could
not be permitted because the system "operated to outlaw and to attaint the
blood and to work a forfeiture of official titles of inheritance, thus affecting
the rights of third parties"'58 (emphasis added). In other words, the ancient
right to trial by jury was a collective right that required consideration of the
rights of other individuals. With the abandonment of sanctions of forfeiture
and outlawry, the court had then to consider whether the modern practice of
157Ibid. at

307-8.

158Ibid. at 296.
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trial by jury "is to guaranty a right or establish a tribunal as an indispensable
part of the government".' 59
It is implicit in the court's formulation of the issue that a right is always a
personal one that is subject to the whims of the rights-bearer, and only in the
event of the law operating such that the rights-bearer's choices may affect
others will the right be transformed from a mere right to an "indispensable
part of the government structure". The ideology of market place justice
prevented the court from recognizing that an abstraction, such as the
community or collective interest, could satisfy the need for finding an adverse
impact on others. Such a finding was necessary for the right to be considered
an indispensable part of the government structure. Without a concrete
manifestation of adverse impact, the court had no difficulty justifying the
practice of waiving the right.
First, the court was perplexed by the notion that an accused can waive
altogether his right to trial by entering a guilty plea, yet not be able to waive
one facet of a trial upon a plea of not guilty. Accordingly, the court found that
a power to waive trial by jury was a logical extension of the greater power to
waive the entire proceedings. This reasoning illustrates the unconscious
infiltration of the underlying market ideology-the waiving of the trial proper
may have become institutionalized, but it is also a practice that has yet to be
justified. It is a weak justification to piggyback one right upon another right
that has yet to be fully justified. Even if the right to waive the trial has a
self-evident justification, it is misleading to categorize all rights as containing
the same general properties, as this creates a version of what Hegel calls "the
60
night in which...all cows are black".
The conclusion that legal rights in general are personal ones designed solely
for the benefit of the individual rights-bearer needs further justification. Far
from being self-evident, this conclusion is, in fact, incoherent. Its incoherence
is manifested in cases that attempt to map the contours of the Patton right to
waive trial byjury. In 1964 the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with a challenge
to the practice of requiring prosecutorial or judicial consent to a defendant's
decision to waive trial by jury. If Patton established that the right is personal
and its exercise is subject to the personal preferences and interests of the
accused, then it seems anomalous to require state approval of the choice.
However, in Singer v. U.S.161 the court concluded that "the ability to waive a
constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the
opposite of that right".' 62 In other words, an accused who does not wish to be
tried by ajury cannot insist that he be tried byjudge alone. The accused is not
"I Ibid. at 288.
Lynd, supra, note 150 at 1421.
Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 at 161 (1964).

160
161
162

Ibid. at 34-5.
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empowered to choose a bench trial because "the Constitution recognizes an
adversary system as the proper method of determining guilt, and the
Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which
it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the
63
government regards as most likely to produce a fair result".
At once the incoherence of the liberal formulation of rights becomes
apparent. On one hand the right is deemed personal and waivable because,
unlike the position at common law, the court concludes that the defendant's
exercise of the right does not adversely affect other individuals. On the other
hand, the waivability of the right is restricted in light of the conclusion that the
state has an interest in the defendant's exercise of the right.164 On one hand,
personal choice is granted to facilitate the autonomy interest of the defendant,
and on the other hand, the autonomy interest is subordinated to the state or
public interest. This inconsistency is reflected in Canadian Charter jurisprudence as well. Appellate courts have noted that the constitutionally
entrenched right to trial by jury does not "make trial by jury obligatory and
can only be read as requiring that an accused have a choice".165 This assertion
is in accord with liberal notions of rights that fixate on furthering autonomy
and individual self-sufficiency; however, the Canadian courts have succumbed
to the incoherence of the Singer position.
In R. v. Turpin,166 the Ontario Court of Appeal was faced with the problem
that the Criminal Code, at the time, allowed waiver of jury trials for murder
cases only in Alberta. At Turpin's trial the judge allowed the accused to waive
this right and have a bench trial. The Ontario Court of Appeal declared the
trial a nullity and concluded that forcing an accused to have a jury trial or
premising the waiver of this right upon the consent of the Attorney General
was not an unconstitutional practice. The court stated:
Even if we assume that trial byjury in a murder case is a benefit only to the
accused (and not to the Crown, representing the public), we do not see
how- he can waive that benefit.... The granting of the benefit does not
mean the converse, namely, that the accused necessarily has a right to
decline the benefit or to have the benefit of not being tried by jury.... We
agree that in this country also the government (i.e. the Crown) has 67
a
legitimate interest in the method of trial of the most heinous of crimes.
163

Ibid. at 36.

It is problematic to ascribe rights to an abstract entity such as the state (see Stoddart,supra,
note 89) and it is likely that the state interest in merely a convenient expression for some form
of public interest. Nevertheless, it becomes even more problematic to have the state exercise
the rights of the public because, presumably, the defendant is a more proper custodian of the
rights. See discussion in Bandes, "Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a
Fair Trial" (1987) 60 Southern Calif. L.Rev. 1019 at 1045-1050.
165Crate, supra, note 101 at 129-30.
I (1987), 60 C.R. (3d) 63.
'6
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Ibid. at 67-68.
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Without a proper justification, and suffering from internal incoherence, the
waivability of rights becomes supported simply on the basis of expediency.
The court, unable to explain fully the phenomenon of rights waiver, is forced
to shift the burden upon those who are opposed to this atomistic and selfinterested view of rights. For example, in Patton the court shifted the burden
by reflecting on the dangers of allowing complete individual control over the
exercise of rights and concluding that there is no evidence of harm created by
the practice:
There is not now, and never was, any practical danger.... Such a theory, at
least in its application to modern American conditions, is based more
upon useless fiction than upon reason. And when the idea of giving
countenance to the right of waiver, as something necessary to a
reasonable protection of the rights and liberties of accused, and as
something intended to be practical and useful in the administration of the
rights of the parties, has been characterized as involving innovation
"highly dangerous", it would..."have been much more convincing and
satisfactory if we had been informed why it would be highly dangerous.'1 68
If the courts will refuse to justify waiver, and insist upon shifting the burden
to those who advocate the abolition of the practice, then it is time to accept the
invitation to show how waiver may be a dangerous practice.

IV. THE DANGERS OF WAIVER
In addressing the issue of the dangers of waiver it is necessary to perform a
delicate balancing of the value of waiver against perceived dangers. At the
outset it must be noted that "one clear advantage of permitting waivers is that
they are a way of minimizing costs". 69 There can be little doubt that waiving
the obligation of the state to obtain a warrant to search, or waiving right to
counsel at an interrogation, or waiving the necessity of proving guilt after a
formal trial all serve to reduce the costs of the administration of justice for the
state. Administrative convenience is always a factor to be considered in
deciding whether to maintain an institutional practice; however, it is a factor
that should carry little weight when balanced against concrete injury to
individuals engaged in the practice. While keeping the factor of decreased cost
in the background, we should turn to the impact of waiver on individuals to
determine whether the U.S. Supreme Court was right in considering the claim
of danger to be a useless fiction.
Courts are aware that waiver of rights poses unique problems for the
achievement of justice. This is why the courts always warn that where
168Patton, supra, note 156 at 296.
169Rubin, supra, note 141 at 488.
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"fundamental rights" are at stake "courts always indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver". 70 This reluctance to embrace fully any
purported waiver of rights is related to the claim by Marshal J. of the U.S.
Supreme Court, in the context of evaluating consent searches, that "no sane
7
person would knowingly relinquish a right to be free from compulsion".' 1
The apparent irrationality of foregoing the exercise of one's rights signals two
related dangers inherent in the practice of waiver. First, there is the question of
whether the waiver of rights in the context of the criminal process actually
secures any benefits for the rights-bearer, and second, there is the question of
whether a court can realistically ascertain if the prerequisites for a valid
invocation of waiver are present, that is, if the waiver is truly voluntary and
informed.
Waiver may be dangerous in that it promises to secure benefits for
cooperative rights-bearers while in actual fact it can only deliver the benefit of
administrative convenience to the state. In general one would assume that
there is a rational motivation for a rights-bearer to decide not to insist on her
rights. It must be recognized that rights "are peculiarly relevant to conflicts
between the will of one party and the contrary will of some other party"'' 72 and,
within this confrontational model of rights, there may be a good reason for
not desiring to assert one's rights. It is said that "rights are harmful because
insisting upon one's rights can be disruptive by transforming loving and caring
relationships into impersonal and antagonistic ones". 173 Therefore a waiver of
rights can serve to avoid transforming relationships into adversarial battles.
This may be true of conflict between private individuals who may desire to
continue their relationship after the conflict has been resolved; however, this
conciliatory approach has little relevance to the criminal process in which an
adversarial relationship between state and individual is presupposed. We do
not have a "family" model of criminal process, 74 and for better or worse, we
assume that the best method for resolving an accusation is to encourage the
litigants to battle it out as adversaries. In any event, it is anomalous to
conceive of a state/ individual relationship as a long-standing, continuous one
that should be fostered by a conciliatory approach to rights. Once the conflict
is resolved the state always does remain a part of the individual's life, but not
in a manner of a private relationship in which the second party interacts with
170Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 310 U.S. 389 at 393 (1937).
171

Schneckloth, supra, note 40 at 281.

172Wellman, A Theory of Rights (New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985) at 195.
17
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Ibid.
A family model of criminal process was articulated by Griffiths, "Ideology in Criminal
Procedure or a Third Model of the Criminal Process" (1970) 79 Yale L.J. 359, in response to
previous models that assumed an "irreconcilable disharmony of interest" (at 367) between
state and citizen. Griffiths starts from "an assumption of reconcilable - even mutually
supportive - interests, a state of love" (at 371). Whether this model is or is not of value, it is
surely just normative and not at all descriptive.
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the rights-bearer on a regular basis and in which the second party can award
future benefits based upon a previous rapprochement.
If the individual cannot benefit through waiver by avoiding transforming a
future relationship into an adversarial one, then it is possible that the rightsbearer may receive tangible benefits within the context of the present conflict.
This is a most difficult argument to sustain. What possible benefit can an
individual receive by cooperating with the police and allowing them to
unreasonably seize incriminating material? What possible benefit can an
individual receive by waiving the right to counsel and providing incriminating
statements? Of course, one may say that an individual who confesses receives
a psychological release or may in fact be able to strike a deal of immunity. This
is true; however, the individual could receive the same benefit without having
waived the right. The psychological release may be muted if the individual
must await consultation with counsel but it is there nonetheless-in addition,
an immunity deal can and should be negotiated in the presence of a counsel
who can advise the individual as to the merits of the proposed deal. With some
rights, i.e. the right to be tried within a reasonable time, it is impossible to
ascertain the concrete benefit that should accompany the waiver, and with
75
other rights benefits are imaginable but remote.
Even without identifying tangible benefits that accompany a waiver, one
may still argue that there is the intangible benefit of increasing the autonomy
of the rights-bearer. The rights-bearer may suffer the loss of rights without
accompanying benefit, but the decision was hers. Her autonomy and freedom
of choice have been respected. The system is structured to give an impression
of an institution that is open to manipulation by the accused-this image is
consistent with liberalism's obsession with widening the sphere of autonomous choice. In addition to the self-evident, intrinsic value of autonomy,
liberalism could also make a great legitimating claim: "a fair process need only
guarantee that you participate in your demise ' . All critical choices in the
process are left in the hands of the accused-how to present a defence, what
admissions to make, what type of jury to choose and whether to even exercise
any of the rights. So, in responding to an inscrutablejury verdict of guilty, an
accused cannot complain that she was unjustly treated. So long as the accused
was adequately informed to enable a genuine, informed choice then it is not
open for the accused to complain later if things turn out not quite as planned
or expected.
The ultimate irony of liberalism's claim of a benefit of fostering autonomy is
that the rights which can lead to developing autonomy and control are usually
175The waiver of one's right to trial appears to have real benefit because of the sentencing
differential applied to guilty pleas. However, one must remember that the judge may not
follow a proposed lower sentence and that the Attorney General can still appeal a negotiated
sentence. Even if the benefit is not considered too remote in light of these factors, there is still
the ethical question of whether the sentencing differential is a justifiable benefit.
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176
exercised on behalf of the accused by a disinterested but partisan lawyer.
Presumably, for the sake of protecting the finality and sanctity of the verdict,
we consider the lawyer's choices as the accused's own. This attribution of
choice is done without any real consideration of whether the accused
participated in the decision. Accordingly, we can never really be certain that
an improvident waiver of rights could at least serve to foster the autonomy of
the rights-bearer.
The presence of professional advocates, both in defence and prosecution,
seriously impairs the image of the criminal process as a market in which
rights-bearers freely negotiate over the price to attach to their exercise of
rights. The presence of "key players" who are not buying and selling on their
accounts leads to a "problem of agency costs determining how each agent can
be given an incentive to act in the interests of his principal". 17 7 Fostering
autonomy is virtually impossible if vital decisions are being exercised by
official agents who may be operating under an agenda that differs from that of
the rights-bearer. Despite the problem of agency costs, the process remains
firm in its commitment to respecting the lawyer's decision as a decision made
by the rights-bearer. The only restriction placed upon waiver in the
marketplace of justice is a timid form of judicial review to ensure that rights
have been waived knowingly or voluntarily. Here we encounter a second
danger related to waiver: not only are we uncertain whether the waiving party
has secured any benefit, but the elusiveness of the benefit makes it virtually
impossible to truly ascertain if the waiver was voluntary.
It has been noted that "voluntariness is an unwieldy notion which is not
amenable to direct assessment and whose use in waiver cases has been a source
of continuing confusion". 78 It is easy to draw an inference of voluntariness if
we can see the actor's decision as being purposive and directed to the obtaining
of some valued benefit. Without evidence of benefit we are left wondering why
the actor would choose a less advantageous course of action, and this
wondering is easily transformed into a suspicion that the actor was misled or
coerced into action. At a minimum we could displace this suspicion of
involuntariness by requiring that all waivers be preceded by a notification to
the rights-bearer of all her legal options and the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each option. Despite the "knowing and intelligent" requirement for some waivers, few courts have ever insisted upon this useful flow of
information to the rights-bearer. The warnings required under s. 10(b) of the
Charterand pursuant to the Mirandacase come close to providing this flow of
information, but even they are fatally flawed. Courts require police to advise
persons under detention that they may consult counsel because the inherent
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See discussion in text accompanying notes 109-113 and 128-133.
Schulhofer, "Criminal Justice as a Regulatory System"(1988) 17 J. Legal Stud. 43 at 49-61.
Rubin, supra, note 141 at 530.
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coerciveness of the interrogation makes it difficult for a court to determine
after the fact if any decision to waive the right to remain silent was voluntary.
However, one can then waive the right to counsel; nothing has changed in the
coercive environment that would make us any less suspicious of the
voluntariness of this waiver.
The presence of counsel not only raises the problem of agency costs and
how to ensure that counsel act in accordance with the interests of their
principal, but their presence also skews the judicial determination of
voluntariness:
Because voluntariness is a meaningful concept only when applied to the
mental processes of a single individual, it is rather difficult to apply to
collective entities. The typical defendant in a criminal case, of course, is a
collective entity composed of the defendant and his lawyer. In some
waiver situations.. .the trial judge will be required to determine the
perceptions and attitudes of a represented defendant. More often,
however, the lawyer's actions will be imputed to79his client, rendering the
client's own knowledge and volition irrelevant.
If waiver of rights were an isolated and infrequent phenomenon, we might
be willing to tolerate the occasional unknowing and involuntary waiver for the
sake of the utilitarian benefit of decreased cost; however, the earlier
examination of the presence of waiver suggests that it is a pervasive practice.
For many rights the frequency with which they are waived is unknown, but in
two areas, guilty pleas and investigative searches, it is clear that waiver has
replaced the traditional method of conducting searches and trials. Reliance
upon waiver is bound to grow "because waiver is an effective device for
reaffirming the existence of procedural rights in the abstract while finding
them inapplicable to particular cases" and courts have therefore "pressed
them into service with increasing frequency". 8 0
The fact that increasingly prevalent waivers create an inexpensive and
informal alternative to the formal adjudicatory process has a disturbing
impact upon the coherent development of existing rights. For example, if the
police have available an inexpensive and informal method for processing
lawbreakers, then the courts may be reluctant to extend or fortify existing
rights for fear that if the right becomes too onerous for the police then they
may attempt to rely upon the informal process of waiver in every case.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court lowered the standard for evaluating
whether the police had probable cause to search, and one of the j'ustifications
for making the standard less onerous upon the police was that "if the affidavits
submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts
179 Ibid. at 531.
190Dix, supra, note 144 at 195.
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have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches,
with the hope of relying upon consent or some other exception to the Warrant
181
Clause that might develop at the time of the search".
The development of doctrine relating to unreasonable search in Canada
and the U.S. illustrates the stultifying impact that waiver and related doctrines
may have. One commentator has noted that courts, in assessing claims of
unreasonable search, employ the "fallacious notion that privacy is an all or
nothing proposition and that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy concerning information partly exposed in a very limited way to a
limited group". 82 An examination of the case law confirms this critique, and
this all or nothing approach can be partially attributable to the logic of waiver.
As discussed earlier, one can become disentitled from claiming protection of
the constitutional right against unreasonable search if one assumes a risk of
exposure by engaging in illegal activity, failing to take precautions against
intrusion by others or by speaking and consorting with others. This doctrinal
constraint upon the development of a sophisticated privacy right is a
manifestation of the waiver-related doctrines of forfeiture and waiver by
omission. By failing to assert your right you become disentitled to claim any
vestiges of privacy. By allowing a notion of waiver by omission to circumscribe the development of the privacy right the court has created the
anomalous scenario that the protection of the Constitution can only be
extended to those who proclaim to the entire world that they do not want to be
disturbed. If the individual relaxes somewhat by marginally exposing her
privacy to a limited group then the court responds by concluding that the
individual has forfeited her entire privacy right instead of reaching the more
reasonable conclusion that the exposure has only lessened the expectation of
privacy, thus reducing the scope of available safeguards.
The problem of total forfeiture of privacy rights may be more a product of
the limited vision of rights as personal rights than the practice of waiverperse.
Waiver is a practical manifestation of the vision of personal rights. The
underlying vision needs remodelling in order to ensure that waiver does not
operate to stultify the growth of constitutional rights. Before turning to a
discussion of the viability of expanding personal rights into collective rights,
there is one more point that needs be made about the dangers of waiver.
There are usually both practical and symbolic components of any given
institutional practice, and one must wonder what ill effects waiver might have
upon the symbolic importance of the criminal trial and due process.
Presumably constitutional rights express a vision of the type of society we
aspire to. A formal process encumbered by rights contributes to this
181 Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 at 2331 (1983).
182 Lafave, "Nine Key Decisions Expand Authority

(1983).
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1989

Waiver in the Criminal Process

aspirational vision and the criminal process should play an integral part in the
affirmation of shared values and ideals. By allowing the formal process, from
investigation to trial, to be displaced by an informal process that is designed
solely to accommodate the subjective interests of the participants we dilute the
"norm production" value of the system. 8 3 Durkheim believed that ideals
"could not survive if they are not periodically revived"' 84 and it is doubtful
that this revivification will ever take place in a criminal process that allows for
a constant relinquishment of the ideals embodied in rights.

V. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
The individualistic underpinnings of rights theory has been the subject of
criticism since Marx proclaimed the primacy of communal droits du
citoyen.'8 5 Traditional rights rhetoric with its perception of individuals as
"separated owners of their respective bundles of rights" 186 may have been
acceptable when the paradigm right was the right to property, but the modern
promulgation of constitutional rights appears to require a different orientation. As indicated earlier, it is conceivable that this new orientation would
revolve around a notion of collective rights that contemplates a joint
ownership of rights. Two practical consequences emerge from this reorientation: first, collective rights introduce a new methodology for analyzing the
scope and strength of a right, and second, the practice of waiver is virtually
abandoned.
The new methodology introduced through collective rights will assist in
curing the current restrictive analysis that is entailed by personal rights and
waiver. Basically, this new methodology is just an elaboration upon a
commonly-held intuition. In the course of debate about the justification for
expanding rights held by criminal defendants, it is common to hear civil
libertarians respond to the fears of law and order proponents by asking these
opponents of rights to consider how they would feel if a member of their
family were caught up in the criminal process without the protection of rights.
This common rhetorical ploy of personalizing the debate in fact reflects the
intuition that rights should not be simply seen as the property of disliked
lawbreakers, but rather, as a protective shield that will apply to all regardless
of our likes and dislikes. This intuition is captured in this recent pronouncement from the Law Reform Commission of Canada:
See Goodpaster, supra, note II at 140-146 for a discussion of a norm production theory of the
criminal trial.
14 Durkheim, "On the Process of Change in Social Values" in T. Parsons, ed., Theories of
Society (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961) 1305 at 1309.
895 Lynd, supra, Iote 150 at 1435.
186 Olsen, supra, note 146 at 393.
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The difficulty in understanding how rules pertaining to the judge's
conduct of trial, to the prosecutor's professional responsibility, or to
defence counsel's role and responsibility protect society, disappears if one
recognizes that society is composed of the individuals within it and that
with crime
the procedural laws which guarantee fairness to those8 charged
7
are laws which guarantee fair treatment to all of us.'
A firmly established conception of collective rights expands upon this
intuition by demanding that an arbiter of dispute always consider how her
interpretation of rights will affect rights-bearers who are not before the court.
As discussed earlier, this may not seem to be a revolutionary claim, but when
put in context of a specific legal problem it becomes clear that this
methodology is a significant departure. The point can be best illustrated by
examining the development of the law of search and seizure.
In 1974 Anthony Amsterdam suggested that there were two approaches to
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure.' 88 The current approach, which he called "atomistic",
emphasizes personal privacy interests and the "protection of atomistic spheres
of interest". 8 9 It was his view that this approach must be replaced by a
regulatory one in which the constitutional guarantee is seen as a regulation of
government conduct requiring "government to order its law enforcement
procedures in a fashion that keeps us collectively secure in our persons,
90
The
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures".
regulatory approach is consistent with the view that constitutional documents
are basically anti-government documents that operate to restrain an insidious
growth of state power. The regulatory approach recognizes that:
The Bill of Rights does not envision an adversary proceeding between two
equal parties.... But, the Constitution recognized the awesome power of
indictment and virtually limitless resources of government investigators.
Much of the Bill of Rights is designed to redress the advantage that
inheres in a government prosecution.' 91
The atomistic approach that is currently employed produces a restrictive
approach to the right because it unduly focuses on the actions and entitlement
of the rights-bearer. We have already seen how the courts have denied
protection by claiming that a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist
for those who engage in illegal activity or for those who fail to take
187Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Procedure(Ottawa: The Commission,
1988) at 13.
18' Supra, note 65.
189Ibid. at 367.
190Ibid.
191Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 at 480 (1973).
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precautions to assert their right. The regulatory approach parallels the
development of a notion of collective rights because it shifts the focus from the
individual rights-bearer to the propriety of state action. The relevant inquiry is
then on how this state action affects the rights of all rights-bearers. Instead of
asking whether a specific criminal defendant has "assumed a risk" of invasion
of privacy, the relevant question is what risks should residents be forced to
assume in an open society.
The collective rights approach nurtures a strong constitutional right that is
not dependent upon ad hominem qualifications. This is clear when we
contrast the two approaches in the context of the question of the constitutionality of "beeper-monitoring". 92 In 1983 the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the propriety of using a radio transmitter to track the
movement of a suspected drug dealer. 93 Using the atomistic, personal rights
approach the court concluded that an individual driving on public streets has
no reasonable expectation of privacy and, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment did not apply. This conclusion was based upon the reasoning that an
individual travelling in public has voluntarily conveyed information concerning his movements to any onlooker, and there is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits state officials from augmenting their sensory
faculties by the use of technology. The practical result of this conclusion is that
the police need not have a warrant, nor need they have any articulable reason
before they attach a radio transmitter to our personal possessions. The total
abandoning of any safeguards raised a fear that this could result in "twentyfour hour surveillance of any citizen", but the court dismissed this fear in a
cavalier fashion by stating that "if such dragnet-type law enforcement
practices.. .should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to
94
determine whether different constitutional principles apply".
A collective rights approach might concede that there is a lessened
expectation of privacy in a moving vehicle; however, it would not produce a
result that totally abandons all safeguards. This is because "collective fourth
amendment rights are measured in part by the effect of aggregated individual
privacy losses on society's feeling of security". 95 When one focuses solely
upon the actions and expectations of the defendant before the court, it is easy
to conclude that the installation of a radio transmitter is no more invasive than
conventional tailing. However, when one considers the future impact of the
police action upon the collective security of all residents, it become obvious
that beeper monitoring poses a threat that far exceeds conventional tailing. It
must be recognized that "the efficiency of beeper monitoring may facilitate a
192 The
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Collective Fourth Amendment Rights" (1985) 71 Virginia L.R. 297.
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higher frequency of surveillance, and its technological nature may generate
greater societal anxiety.. .and the knowledge of government surveillance
creates an anxiety in individuals not under investigation that the state may
treat them similarly". 96 Once the collective security of all residents is
recognized as a pivotal factor then the court will be free to consider the impact
of the state practice on associational freedom, on the collective inhibition of
common activities such as wandering or strolling, and on the interest of
residents in maintaining anonymity and freedom from attention.
The collective nature of constitutional rights is reflected in First Amendment jurisprudence. The overbreadth doctrine allows a speaker who is
engaged in constitutionally prohibited speech to challenge a statute that is
substantially overbroad in its application to others. 97 In other words, even if a
particular defendant's speech is clearly covered by a prohibitory statute which
is constitutional in its application to her speech, the speaker will still be
allowed to mount a challenge to the statute in order to protect the interests of
other speakers whose free speech rights may be chilled by the overly broad
sweep of the statute.
Even if constitutional rights require consideration of the interests of the
collective this does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that waiver and
related doctrines are to be abandoned. The new methodology of analyzing
rights by reference to collective interests does not impair the popular rights
theory that views rights as "protected choices". 98 This theory, known as the
choice, will or power theory, promotes the idea "of the right holder having the
freedom to choose among a set of options, and of this freedom being protected
by a set of duties imposed on others". 199 Modern rights theory sees a right as a
complex of Hohfeldian positions that contains a core element and a protective
perimeter of associated elements. 200 Regardless of whether we are dealing with
a Hohfeldian claim right, power or immunity, "the unifying factor" is that "the
law specifically recognizes the choice of an individual either negatively by not
impeding or obstructing it (liberty and immunity) or affirmatively by giving
20 1
legal effect to it (claim and power)".
Under a power or will theory of rights, it is inconceivable to entertain a
notion of an inalienable right because a decision to waive, sell, forgo or
transfer the content of the right is the lifeblood of the right. Despite the
202
rhetoric of the 18th century proclaiming the "inalienable rights of man",
196Ibid. at

317-318.
See discussion in Lockhart, Kamisar and Choper, Constitutional Law: Cases-CommentsQuestions 5th ed. (St. Paul: West, 1980).
118Sumner, supra, note 2 at 46.
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modern liberal rights theory has not been comfortable with inalienability and
restrictions on the marketability of rights. Inalienability is an elusive concept:
"sometimes inalienable means nontransferable, sometimes only non-saleable.
Sometimes inalienable means non-relinquishable by a rightholder, sometimes
it refers to rights that cannot be lost at all". 203
Within the context of the criminal process the most appropriate conception
of an inalienable right is that it "cannot be relinquished by the individuals who
possess them". 2 4 It is a claim that "the consent of the rightholder is
insufficient to extinguish the right or to transfer it to another". 205 In
addressing the issue of whether inalienability of legal rights and the
corresponding abandonment of the practice of waiver is a justifiable
restriction of a right, it is important to note that one is not dealing with a claim
that legal rights are absolute. In restricting the choice of the rights-holder one
is not making the corresponding claim that inalienability means that a right is
paramount and can never be overridden. In fact, most of the rights embodied
by the Charter contemplate the possibility of a superior state interest
outweighing the right. The question presented by the reorientation of rights as
collective rights is whether, absent a superior state interest, the individual can
voluntarily waive the application of the right.
This power theory of rights does not fit comfortably with the approach to
remedying constitutional violations of legal rights in the criminal process.
Presumably, the power theory contemplates a rational rights-bearer deliberating upon the costs and benefits of asserting her rights and ultimately
deciding to claim her rights if she believes that litigation will provide her with
adequate recompense for her rights-loss. However, the constitutional remedies for violation of rights are not altogether concerned with adequate
recompense-the remedies extend far beyond what is necessary to compensate the aggrieved party.
The most common remedies under s.24 of the Charterfor violation of the
legal rights are either a stay of proceedings or the exclusion of evidence. In
most cases the accused is the beneficiary of the chosen remedy, but this is not
the intended distribution of the value of the remedy. For example, the court
will still order exclusion of evidence even if the excluded evidence is
insignificant and will have no impact on the trial. Exclusion of evidence may
be similar to nominal damages in some cases because it doesn't bestow a
benefit upon the claimant. The granting of this remedy without corresponding
benefit is properly understood with reference to the other common remedythe stay of proceedings. When the government violates our legal rights the
203M.J. Radin, "Market Inalienability" (1987) 100 Harv. L.Rev. 1849 at 1850.
204 Myers, "The Rationale for Inalienable Rights in Moral Systems"(1981) 7 Soc. Theory Pract.
127 at 127.
205Barnett, "Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights"(1986) 4 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 179 at 185.
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court awards a remedy to nullify the actions of the state. The remedy is
granted to wipe clean any vestiges of foul play. Unlike an ordinary right whose
violation attracts a remedy of making the aggrieved party whole, the
constitutional right requires a remedy that makes the entire process whole.
The accused may benefit but this is an incidental by-product.
This is clear from examining the rhetoric employed in invoking exclusion of
evidence as a remedy. The American courts "assert that the remedy is not for
the individual at all, but rather is invoked for the benefit of society's interest in
206
deterring government behaviour which violates the fourth amendment".
The Supreme Court of Canada has not embraced this deterrence rationale but
it has noted that the decision to exclude is "grounded in community values"
and is intended to preserve judicial integrity by avoiding "judicial condonation of unacceptable conduct by the investigatory and prosecutorial
agencies". 207 If the remedy is grounded in collective values, and the remedy is
regulatory in nature by being designed to maintain the balance of power
between state and individual, then surely the right must be similarly
conceived. A constitutional right should be seen as a method of structuring
and regulating state power and once this unique element of constitutional
rights is firmly grounded then it is possible to argue that "rights that are
relational and systemic are necessarily inalienable: individuals cannot waive
208
them because individuals are not their sole focus".
Once we have recognized the "relational and systemic" content of
constitutional rights it becomes easier to displace the popular power theory of
rights with its rival theory, the interest or welfare theory. Whereas the power
theory conceives of the rights-holder as an "active manager of a network of
normative relationships", the interest theory conceives of the rights-holder as
209
a "passive beneficiary of a network of protective duties shared by others".
Under this theory rights are protected interests, and the core element of a right
is not the rightsholder's autonomous choice to pursue or abandon the right
but rather is the beneficial interest which the law has deemed of sufficient
importance to warrant normative protection. Redefining rights as protected
interests and not protected choices may be more consistent with the collective
underpinnings of constitutional rights; however, it does not necessarily
advance the claim that the constitutional right is inalienable. If a right is
designed as a benefit to the rights-bearer's interest then surely we should allow
the rights-bearer to waive this right when she rationally believes that insistence
upon the right will not advance her interests.
206D. Dorenber, "The Right of the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests
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In order to move justifiably from an interest theory of rights to a practice of
inalienability, it is necessary to elaborate further upon the nature of the
protected interest and the means chosen to protect the interest. This further
elaboration will reveal that some constitutional legal rights are more properly
conceived of as immunity-rights with their focus being upon the correlative
state disability. The first step in this process is to recognize that the interest
protected is not an individual self-interest. An interest worthy of protection is
a good, attribute, endeavour or practice that is deemed conducive to the
development of personhood. A particular individual may not desire this good
or attribute but the good must still be protected because other individuals may
see it as indispensable to the attainment of uniquely human goals. So long as
the individual belongs to a class capable of being interested in the good then
she is entitled to the right because:
[T]he idea of [being] interested in something does not carry the
implication of self-regarding concerns which goes with the narrow idea of
interests as that which is for the benefit of A. What a person is interested in
may often be some condition of himself, but it need not be. He may be
interested in the development of knowledge, the welfare of others, artistic
conceptions, sports, animals, foreign countries, and so on, none of which
can be seen as tied up with his self-interest in the sense of self-regarding
interests. 210
This conception of interest is consistent with liberalism's belief in the
subjectivity of value, but it does not embrace liberalism's obsession with
personal choice. Certain rights may be detrimental if exercised by the rightsbearer, but this does not suggest that the rights-bearer can voluntarily
renounce her possession of the right:
Though rights are based on the interests of the rights-holder, an
individual may have rights which it is against his interest to have. A
person may have property which is more trouble than it is worth. It may
be in a person's interest to be imprisoned, even while he has a right to
freedom. The explanation of this puzzle is that rights are vested in
rights-holders because they possess certain general characteristics: they
are the beneficiaries of a promise, nationals of a certain state, etc. Their
those characteristics, but
rights serve their interests as individuals with
2
they may be against their interests overall. 11
The interests protected by the legal rights in the Charier relate to privacy,
fair trial and freedom from arbitrary interference; however, these rights all
relate to one overriding interest - the interest of all residents in ensuring that
state power and authority remain constrained by the prescribed constitutional
210
211
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limitations. The combined effect of the legal rights is to define the proper
relationship between state and individual, and as such the primary interest is
in maintaining the constitutive nature of the rights. This is not an interest that
is subject to personal ownership; the integrity of the constitutional ordering of
social relations is dependent upon the universality of its application. As
indicated earlier with reference to welfare-state restrictions upon the free
market, the universality of the program is a key ingredient to its success.
In effect, the reorientation of constitutional rights within the framework of
an interest or welfare theory converts discretionary rights into mandatory
rights. 212 For example, the right to an education (education being a protected
interest) contemplates a right of children to attend school, but it also entails a
duty to attend. It is in the interest of all residents to live in an educated society
and "each person has a right that other persons be educated, and in virtue of
the right that others have that he be educated, he has himself a duty to attend
school".2 1 3 Similarly, it is in the interests of all residents that the state respect
its constitutionally defined boundaries, and thus the individual accused has a
duty to claim all the attendant rights which define her status as an accused and
which structure the authority of state power.
21 4
In the case of mandatory rights "duty and right are entirely coincident".
The gist of these rights is the imposition of duties and at times it is superfluous
even to mention rights. However, it is not only the duty of the individual
accused as trustee of the public interest that is vital. What emerges as the
essence of legal rights is the obligation, duty or disability thrust upon the state.
21 5
Most of the legal rights are "rights of recipience" and not "rights of action";
that is, the legal rights are not inherently exercisable. One cannot in a vacuum
exercise one's right to counsel or one's expectation of privacy or one's right to
a fair trial within a reasonable time. It is one's duty to insist upon these rights,
but one does not insist upon these things until the state has taken measures to
place her in the position of being a suspect or accused person. Even when the
state has taken the necessary steps to make these rights relevant to the
state/individual interaction, these rights remain nonexercisable because the
accused is basically a passive recipient. The essence of a non-exercisable right
is the corresponding duty that a second party must fulfill. The duty is
paramount because "non-exercisable rights are not distinct from the obliga21 6
tions to which they correspond".
A right to a fair trial and the right to be tried within a reasonable time are
definitely non-exercisable rights; however, other rights, such as privacy and
a discussion of mandatory rights, see J. Feinberg, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of
Liberty (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980) at 232-238.
231bid. at 233.
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freedom from arbitrary detention, cannot be considered pure rights of
recipience because there is nothing that the state is obligated to provide.
Rather, the state is disabled from invading your protected sphere unless
certain prerequisites are established. Therefore, in addition to the rights of
recipience, the legal rights of the Chartercontemplate immunity rights. An
immunity right secures a sphere of activity that others lack the legal power to
change or invade. As Hart points out:
The chief, though not the only employment of an immunity from adverse
legal change which we may call an immunity right is to characterize
distinctively the position of individuals from such adverse change by
constitutional
limitations or, as Hohfeld would say, by disabilities of the
217
legislature.
If a legislature is disabled from changing one's legal entitlement then surely
its agents, police and prosecutor, cannot accomplish indirectly through
waiver what could not be accomplished directly through legislation. As with
rights of recipience, immunity rights speak more to the second party than to
the rights-bearer who basically remains a passive beneficiary of the state
obligation or disability. Waiver is more appropriately considered in relation
to claim rights in which the right is not activated without action taken by the
rights-bearer. With respect to passive rights the actions and decisions of the
rights-bearer become less consequential and significant.
Accordingly, there are two ways of characterizing legal rights in the Charter
and both characterizations make the state obligation or disability the salient
factor. If this is so it is not difficult to support a conception of inalienable
rights because the rights-bearer is no longer the focus of the right. If the right is
fully defined by the corresponding duty or disability there is something
disturbing about permitting the obligated party to escape its obligation by
attempting to secure release by the intended beneficiary. The nature of the
right requires the state to take action to satisfy its obligation or to restrict its
actions to comply with its disability-the entire scheme is subverted if the state
is first permitted to maneuver to secure a release from its obligations. It seems
morally objectionable to promise something with the hope of being released
from the promise at a later date.
The traditional approach to rights conceived of the right as the salient
feature, and the duty logically followed or was justified by the establishment
of the right. The duty, obligation or disability became an afterthought, and
this was consistent with the common law's relegation of many duties to the
supererogatory category. Duties, such as the contentious duty to rescue, were
217
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left outside the scope of the law because the imposition of certain duties was
seen as coerced benevolence or altruism. The liberalism of the common law
seemed content with establishing the protective sphere of individual rights,
and any movement towards the imposition of positive duties was viewed with
suspicion. The modern history of international human rights covenants
confirms this suspicion of duties, as many Western industrial nations were
reluctant to affirm the existence of economic and social rights that impose
affirmative obligations upon government.
Accordingly, the reorientation of constitutional legal rights with the
increased salience of duties and disabilities is counter-intuitive for many
theorists. As with the duty to rescue, an unconditional obligation upon the
state to provide certain goods regardless of the rights-bearer's wishes is open
to the objection that the scheme is unduly paternalistic. When the mandatory,
collective rights in the Constitution are analogized to the mandatory right to
education the potential paternalistic flaw is exposed. We agree that there is a
duty to attend school, but this duty only applies to young people. Mandatory
rights that are not waivable by the rights-bearer are acceptable when the
rights-bearer does not have the capacity to rationally assess her self-interest.
In fact, courts have already acknowledged that some of the legal rights of the
Charter are not waivable when the defendant is a child; 21 8 however, the
absence of a power of waiver for adult offenders is objectionably paternalistic.
Some may argue that paternalism is not objectionable; however, most people
try to avoid using paternalism as a ground or justification for legal
intervention. Nevertheless, this objection is easily overcome.
First, the characterization of the scheme as paternalistic misconceives the
nature of collective rights because the contention that "inalienable rights are
paternalistically grounded... appears to rest on the assumption that whatever
duties are implied by such rights, they are owed to the possessors of those
rights".21 9 Both the duty imposed upon the state and the duty imposed upon
the individual to insist upon the right are not self-regarding duties-they are
duties owed to society at large. The other-regarding nature of collective rights
makes the claim of paternalism simply irrelevant. Even if one is not convinced
that the duties owed by these rights are directed towards a collective
beneficiary, it can still be argued that inalienable constitutional rights are not
an example of true paternalism. Calabresi and Melamed, two theorists who
appear committed to the ideology of the market, characterize constitutional
rights as an exercise in the less objectionable practice of "self-paternalism": "it
merely allows the individual to choose what is best in the long run rather than

218See, e.g., R. v. H. (1986), 19 C.R.R. 68 (Man. C.A.).
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in the short run, even though that choice entails giving up some freedom of
220
choice".
Whether the collective, non-waivable right is an exercise of true or self
paternalism is not important because even those who believe in the logic of the
market and universal commodification admit that paternalism can be allowed
if it fits within the ideology of the marketplace. Generally, restrictions on
alienability are condemned because they are economically inefficient; however, when a transaction might create significant "externalities" (i.e. costs to
third parties) then inalienability may be allowed to correct for market
failure. 221 Two arguments that address the concerns of anti-paternalists are
222
the "prophylactic argument" and the "domino theory".
The prophylactic argument concedes that free marketability is the norm;
however, sometimes the nature of the good which the accused is trading
"might arouse suspicion that her act is coerced". 223 The risk of harm of coerced
transactions, and the great difficulty and cost in attempting to evaluate the
voluntariness of every transaction outweighs the presumed harm of restrictions upon alienability. The thrust of this argument can be understood by
reference to the claim that the right to life is inalienable. In most countries
suicide is no longer prohibited by sanction, and this may suggest that the right
to life is not inalienable because it is waivable. However, the inalienability of
the right to life is directed towards proscribing agreements between parties to
take the life of the other. Aiding and abetting suicide is still a criminal offence,
and this facet of inalienability is acceptable because of a prophylactic
argument:
When only one party is involved the question of whether consent is
genuine does not arise. But if one person is allowed to take the life of
another simply because he has consented, this issue must be dealt with.
And the obvious worry is that it will be difficult to determine whether any
particular killing is one that
was done with the consent of the victim or
224
was cold-blooded murder.
Similarly, it may be argued that the inherent coerciveness of most
state/individual transactions makes it difficult to accept waivers as voluntary
at face value. Related to this prophylactic argument is the domino theory
which "envisions a slippery slope leading to market domination". 225 That is to
say, allowing some rights to be commodified and market-negotiable may lead
220
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to a gradual commodification of all rights. This theory assumes that it is
important to maintain the purity of some rights, and that the slow movement
towards admitting waiver into all facets of the criminal process will endanger
the other rights that we believe should be free from infiltration by the market
ideology. The denigration of rights under the domino theory is once again best
illustrated by reference to the right to life:
Allowing a person to kill another simply because the latter consents will

create a moral climate in which the lives of all persons will be less secure.
People may become hardened and less outraged when someone's life is
taken. Such a society may eventually take less seriously a violation of a

person's right to life. A legal system cannot, without great difficulty, both
claim to place a high value on human life and allow some to kill human
beings simply because they have consented. 226

Legal rights under the Charter should be presumptively inalienable. It
should not count as a justification for their infringement to point to the
consent of the individual. First, it is not in the power of the individual to
consent to abandoning the constitutional scheme because the rights are not
personally possessed by this individual. Allowing individual consent to
operate as a justification for constitutional violations adversely affects the
interests of others in seeing that the state keeps within its constitutional
boundaries. Not only does waiver harm other residents but it may harm the
waiving party in light of the uncertainty of knowing whether a decision to
forgo a right is truly voluntary and informed. Finally, the practice of waiver
denigrates the significance of rights by conceiving of all rights as fungible and
commodifiable. Constitutional rights are unique. They serve a function that is
distinct from the design of private rights. Waiver becomes an unjustifiable
practice once we clearly see constitutional norms as:
Norms concerned with structuring power relationships to avoid the
creation or perpetuation of hierarchy in which some perennially dominate
others.... These norms serve not only to recognize spheres of personal
autonomy, but also to replace vertically stratified patterns of power with
more horizontal or egalitarian arrangements-between accuser and
accused, between governors and governed, between the Union and the
States, between those who hold power and those who aspire to it.227

VI. A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE
Waiver may be an objectionable practice when analyzed in general, abstract
terms. However, a concrete examination of the various legal rights shows that
226
227
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it is difficult to analyze them as a uniform group. Some rights are patently
unwaivable, e.g. the protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and
other rights seem patently waivable, e.g. the right to cross-examine witnesses.
The preceding discussion attempted to provide a general critique of waiver,
but now it is time to fine tune the analysis to accommodate the counterexamples of rights that are evidently waivable.
It would be absurd to suggest that an accused cannot waive her right to
cross-examine. To force counsel to question every witness would convert
cross-examination into an empty ritual. It is equally absurd to suggest that an
accused can consent to being flogged or shackled, as the waiver of the right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment could lead to enormous barbarity.
A criterion for determining which rights are subject to waiver and which are
not can be deduced by trying to establish the features that distinguish the right
to cross-examine from the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
punishment.
First, one can attempt to establish a lexical priority amongst rights, and
state that some rights are too important or fundamental to allow for waiver.
This methodology is doomed to failure because of the subjectivity of values. It
may be obvious that the right to cross-examine is less fundamental than the
right against cruel and unusual punishment; however, distinctions based upon
importance and significance become blurry when we try to assess the relative
importance of privacy, freedom from arbitrary detention and other rights.
Attempting to employ a method of analytical deduction to decide which rights
are indispensable for a just process and which rights are simply advantageous
is beset with problems:
There are two problems with this "conceptual-deductive" approach.
First, no one has ever convincingly demonstrated that deductive analysis
alone is capable of telling us why some rights are less "fundamental" than
others.... But even assuming consensus could be achieved on some finelytuned calibration of the relative "fundamentalness" of rights, there is a
second difficulty with the deductive approach. It simply does not follow
logically that because, e.g. due process is "less fundamental" than
free
228
speech, that therefore due process guarantees should be waivable.
Perhaps, the right to cross-examine can be distinguished from cruel and
unusual punishment in that the former is a "right of action", a "freedom to",
whereas the latter is a "right of recipience", a "freedom from". Previously, it
was claimed that non-waivability attached to passive "rights of recipience"
because the salient and defining feature of this type of right was the attendant
state obligation or disability. For these rights, the interests of the rights-bearer
become submerged and juridically insignificant. This dichotomy of legal
228Klare, supra, note 146 at 476-477.
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rights is an attractive criterion for analyzing waiver, yet there is one glaring
omission. The right to privacy, as protected by the s. 8 guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure, seems to be both a right of action and a right
of recipience. The right to be left alone suggests a passive right to receive, but
there is also an element within the right that requires some assertions and
actions to be taken to safeguard one's privacy. Considering that this
constitutional right largely governs the entire investigatory process, its
ambiguous characterization is too large a gap in the criteria of active/ passive
rights.
Another way in which the right to cross-examine and the right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment can be distinguished is by a functional
analysis. Cross-examination is only valuable in an instrumental sense-artful
cross-examination can aid in securing a fair trial. The right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment has intrinsic value; it is not designed to secure
some other greater good. This right is purely designed to uphold respect for
the dignity of the person. One can always take a particular good and infinitely
regress to a position where this good is always seen as instrumental in securing
another good; however, it is suggested that the regression is not useful once
229
one has identified a good that pertains to personhood and human identity.
These goods, as controversial as they are, should be considered goods of
intrinsic merit that do not require further justification by showing some
instrumental value.
This distinction leads to an analysis of the legal rights of the Charterinto
core and derivative rights.2 30 A right that is grounded in another is a derivative
right. The core rights of the Charterall contain justification for their existence
by virtue of their direct relationship with a protected interest. Derivative
rights do not relate directly to a protected interest, rather their function is one
of instrumentality-they facilitate the obtaining of the core right. The obvious
example is once again the right to cross-examine. This right is derived from
the core right to a fair trial. Respect for human dignity necessitates the
existence of a right to a fair trial before the state can inflict punishment, but
229Radin, supra, note 203 at 1903-1909 takes the position that a good is non-commodifiable if the

good is important to personhood and human flourishing.
230
See Raz, supra, note 211 at 197-199. The core rights discussed in this paper bring to mind a
liberal conception of rights that is premised upon the assertion of the intrinsic value of dignity
and autonomy. If the core-derivative distinction amongst rights is in fact just another
formulation of distinctly liberal values, then it may be reasonable to ask if the plea, initially
advanced in this paper, to recognize constitutional rights as collective rights, is defeated by the
retreat to recognizable liberal ground. First, it must be recognized that liberal and
communitarian values do not stand in perpetual opposition-they are not logical opposites.
Second, the potential impossibility of ever achieving a communitarian aspiration of
inalienable rights must be recognized, and the demands of constitutional aspirations must be
kept to a manageable level by limiting the rigours of non-waivability to core rights that are
distinctly liberal is not a retreat to stale liberalism, but rather is a strategy to ensure the
viability of reconceiving rights as having non-waivable, collective elements.
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the right to cross-examine is justified solely by its utility in achieving the core
right.
This distinction between core and derivative rights is consistent with
another method of distinguishing waivable and non-waivable rights. Earlier,
it was mentioned that one of the dangers of waiver was the elusiveness of a
tangible benefit to the party that decides to waive. Accordingly, waiver would
not appear dangerous if we could be certain that the waiving party is receiving
some benefit, or at least is not losing some advantage. Edward Rubin has
analyzed the propriety of waiver by looking for some "functional alternative"
to the right being waived:
The basic way in which this translation from formal to informal
interactions can be achieved is to require that parties who waive a
particular right obtain the functional equivalent of that right in the
context of their more informal interaction.... Because a right is an
essential part of the relationship, it can only be altered, in form, but not
totally eliminated. In other words, rights being waived are structuring
devices; they can be relinquished only if acceptable
alternative means of
23
structuring the relationship are employed. '
The waiver of a derivative right usually will not foreclose the possibility of
there being acceptable alternative means of structuring the relationship. The
decision not to cross-examine will not necessarily result in the loss of the core
right of a fair trial. There are alternative methods, other than crossexamination, of ensuring that the state's guarantee of a fair trial is upheld.
However, the loss of a core right is fatal. There are many paths that can be
taken to reach the core right, but at the core is a dead end. Once the core is lost
through waiver it is irretrievable.
Accordingly, it is necessary to provide a typology of legal rights that will
divide rights into their core and derivative elements. I only intend to sketch an
outline, in full recognition that this constructed typology needs to be
expanded upon. A possible typology may be constructed in the following
manner:
I)

CORE RIGHT: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Section 8 of the Charterguarantees the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure by securing a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Therefore, this right cannot be waived and the practice of consent search
and wiretap is virtually abolished.
2)

231

CORE RIGHT: THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM ARBITRARY
INTERFERENCE WITH LIBERTY
Section 9 of the Charterguarantees the right to be free from arbitrary
detention or imprisonment. Other rights are instrumental in securing this

Rubin, supra, note 141 at 537.
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right and these derivative rights are: (i) s. l0 - the provision of information
upon detention to assist the individual in assessing whether the detention
is arbitrary - this includes the right to be informed of the reasons for
detention, the right to consult counsel, and the right to test the detention
by way of habeas corpus.
3)

CORE RIGHT: THE RIGHT AGAINST COMPELLED SELFINCRIMINATION
The Charter does not explicitly guarantee this right; however, judicial
construction has introduced this right as a constituent element of
fundamental justice under s. 7232 and as a core right from which the s. 10
guarantee of right to counsel can be derived. 233 Support for a core right
against self-incrimination can be found in the derivative rights under
s. I l(c) (the right not to be compelled as a witness) and s. 13 (the right of an
accused not to have previous testimony used against her.. .in subsequent
proceedings). An unusual feature of this core right is that it contemplates
waiver by its very formulation - the right merely protects against
compelled self-incrimination, not consensual self-incrimination. It is
necessary to frame this right in this manner because making this core right
non-waivable will result in conflict with another fundamental freedom;
that is to say, freedom of expression requires that a person, for whatever
reason, should be able to choose to speak to public officials even when the
speech is incriminating.

4)

CORE RIGHT: THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Section Il(d) of the Charter guarantees a trial before an impartial
tribunal and a procedure by which guilt must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. The impartiality of the tribunal and the burden of
proof are the defining elements of this core right. Other subsections
provide derivative rights that facilitate the fairness of the trial: (i) s. l 1(a)
-the right to be informed of the specific offence; (ii) s. l (f) - the right to be
tried by a jury; (iii) s. 14 - the right to an interpreter.

5)

CORE RIGHT: THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR ONE'S
AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY
This vague prescription covers the largely unrelated rights that attempt to
treat the individual as an end and not as a means to an end. This core right
is in fact a group of core rights including: (i) s. l I(g) - the right not to be
punished for an offence not known to law at the time of the act or
omission; (ii) s. I (h) - the right not to be tried twice for the same offence;
(iii) s. I I(i) - the right to the benefit of the lesser punishment if the
prescribed punishment has been raised since the commission of the
offence; (iv) the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

232R. v.
233 That

Wooley (1988), 25 O.A.C. 390 (Ont. C.A.).

is to say most cases that discuss the right to counsel at interrogation assume that this
right is useful by virtue of its being able to protect one's right to remain silent. The formulation
of waiver of the right to counsel in Clarkson, supra, note 75, requires an awareness of
consequences evaluation, and presumably this means that one can only waive the right to
counsel if one is sufficiently aware that one has the right to exercise the core right to remain
silent.
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There are a number of loose ends that need to be mentioned. First, it is
apparent that s. 7 (the right not to be deprived of life, liberty and security
except in accordance with fundamental justice) and s. 1 (b) (the right to be
tried within a reasonable time) have not been placed within the typology.
Section 7 has been omitted because it lacks a definable content and the
Supreme Court of Canada has proceeded on the assumption that this section
is a compendious expression of the specifically enumerated rights found in ss.
8-14 of the Charter. 234 Section I 1(b) has been omitted because the Supreme
Court of Canada is still struggling with the issue of whether a trial within a
reasonable time is merely instrumental in securing a fair trial or whether it
serves to reduce the attendant anxiety, stigma, and inconvenience while
awaiting trial. 235 On the former interpretation it is a derivative right that is

waivable and on the latter interpretation it fits within the core right of respect
for autonomy and dignity.
In addition, the typology does not specifically address the issues of standing
and forfeiture. Briefly, it is part and parcel of the conversion of personal rights
into collective rights that the requirements for standing are virtually
abolished. If the upholding of legal rights is in the interest of all then it stands
to reason that anyone may launch an action for a declaration that certain state
action is violative of the Charter. Unlike the dramatic modification of the
standing rules, a notion of collective rights does not require the abolition of
the practice of forfeiting rights by operation of law. In order to be a member of
the collectivity that is protected by constitutional rights there may be certain
membership qualifications. Misconduct may disentitle one from claiming the
benefit of the collective right, and all the court need do is ensure that the
qualifications for membership are rational: i.e. this is simply a paraphrase of
the current approach, previously discussed, 36 in which the court undertakes a
s. 1 analysis to determine if forfeiture is a proportionate response to the
misconduct.
The consequence of this proposal is a dramatic reduction in the incidence of
waiver. While the rights to trial by jury and to counsel remain waivable, the
right to be free from unreasonable search and the right to a fair trial may not
view that s. 7 is merely a compendious expression of the other specified rights was
advanced in Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (1986), 48 C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.)
and applied in Mills, supra, note 4 at 537. Recent invocations of s.7 to invalidate abortion law

234The

(Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen (1988), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.)) and
constructive murder law ( Vaillancourt v. R. (1987), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636) suggest that s. 7 has a
content far exceeding the specified prescription is ss. 8-14. However, it is far from clear how
these decisions affect the interpretation of legal process rights.
235In Mills and Rahey, supra, notes 4 and 8, Lamer J. claims that 1I(b) has nothing to do with
fair trial, but most of the other judges have preferred not to classify Charter provisions into
watertight compartments. A consensus relating to the rationale for this right has yet to clearly
emerge.
236
Supra, note 92-101.
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be waived. This requires the abolition of consent search and wiretap, and most
significantly, the abolition of pleading guilty and plea bargaining. Before
turning to a brief discussion of these significant changes, it should be noted
that the legitimate waiver of derivative rights still poses the danger of
involuntary waiver.
The practice of waiver should be carefully circumscribed by procedural
safeguards that will minimize the risk of coercion. George Dix proposes four
requirements that are both sensible and not overly onerous for the state: 1) "a
requirement that a defendant have articulated in some reasonably unambiguous manner his choice to forgo a right"; 2) "a requirement that a
defendant have articulated an awareness of sufficient information about the
nature and effects of his choice"; 3) "imposition on some person with official
status of an affirmative duty to elicit a subject's awareness of relevant
information"; 4) "the embodiment of the official inquiry or the subject's
articulation in a contemporaneous formal record". 237 The rights that can be
waived may be derivative in nature, but the defendant must at least be
informed of the alternative methods by which she can secure the core rights.
An examination of the rights now considered non-waivable might lead one
to argue that the scheme is wholly unrealistic and impractical. The abolition of
consent search would take away one of the prime investigative tools of the
police. Law enforcement officials would argue that consent search is a
necessary tool in situations of emergency: for example, if a bomb threat is
received the police will need to secure the consent of many property-owners in
order to locate the bomb. The emergency situation is not affected by the
abolition of waiver because the police are still empowered to search in order to
avert catastrophe; however, the police are not entitled to use evidence seized,
during an emergency search, in a criminal proceeding. Restrictions on waiver
affect the position of criminal defendants at trial, but not necessarily police
powers which do not result in criminal prosecutions.
In fact, the abolition of consent search is not as dramatic as it first appears.
Properly conceived, the ban on waiver of this core right operates to deny legal
significance to an individual's consent to an unreasonable search. There is
nothing that disallows an individual from consenting to a reasonable search.
The core right to privacy is not an absolute right; rather it is a right that can be
overridden by a superior state interest. A superior state interest exists when
the state has a credible belief in the probability of crime; therefore the core
right should more accurately be formulated as a right to privacy except when
the state has probable cause to invade. The requirement of obtaining a
warrant is merely a further procedural safeguard to ensure that the state is
truly in possession of probable cause. Accordingly, a search without probable
237

Dix, supra, note 144 at 206-207.
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cause is unreasonable per se, whereas a search without a warrant is only
presumptively unreasonable. This presumption can be defeated by the
presence of specified exceptions to the warrant requirement; a legitimate
exception would be the obtaining of an individual's consent.
In other words, an individual cannot consent to a search that is unreasonable because probable cause is lacking, but an individual can consent to a
search that is lacking only in the warrant requirement. This analysis
introduces the notion of detrimental reliance into the proposal. If the state has
probable cause and then searches on consent in lieu of obtaining a warrant, it
would be unfair to allow the individual at trial to claim that she has changed
her mind and that she wants to contest the previously given consent. The state
has detrimentally relied upon the consent because, if not for the consent, the
state could have obtained a warrant and thus have converted a presumptively
unreasonable search into a reasonable one. However, if the state secures a
consent for a search that lacks probable cause then the same detrimental
reliance cannot be claimed. At the time of conducting the search there was
nothing that the state could have done to convert the search into a reasonable
one: therefore, the state cannot argue that by relying upon the consent they
were precluded from curing the constitutional deficiency at the time of the
238
search.
The proposal to abolish guilty pleas (in the sense of the plea being
dispositive of the case) and plea bargaining is even more contentious than the
abolition of consent searches. There are many who believe that the entire
administration of justice would collapse if defendants could no longer plead
guilty. This doomsday assumption is a product of a myopic vision that
evaluates all proposals within the narrow framework of Anglo-American
adversarial justice. The administration of criminal justice in Europe does not
recognize the guilty plea as a juridically significant event. The guilty plea is
treated just as a confession, i.e. another tough and undoubtably very cogent
piece of evidence. The absence of the option of pleading guilty and the rigidity
of the principle of compulsory prosecution forecloses the emergence of plea
bargaining as an alternative method of processing accused people. 39
the position advanced by Westen, supra, note 92. He claims (at 1260) "in the
absence of prejudice to the state...[a defendant who has previously waived rights] is equally
entitled to assert his rights afterwards as before". Hence, the conventional view of waiverthat constitutional rights instantly vanish at the precise moment a defendant declares his wish
to relinquish them-is misconceived. The controlling factor in the area of waiver is not the
defendant's state of mind but the effect his decision has on the interests of the 'state. Thus, the
state cannot hold a defendant to waiver unless it can represent in good faith that it relied to its
detriment on his decision or that it would suffer substantial prejudice if he were allowed to
rescind.
239
See discussion in J. Langbein, "Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It"
(1979) 78 Mich. L. Rev. 206. Also, see discussion in articles cited in notes 55, 56, 115, 116 and
246.
238This is basically
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The core right of fair trial is partly defined by a burden of proof that
requires guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, one
cannot waive this right by conceding guilt, as this concession only raises a high
probability of guilt that must be confirmed by other inquiries. The Continental systems view a confession/guilty plea as just another piece of evidence,
and even in the presence of a concession of guilt they must conduct a trial. Of
course, the uncontested trial is a rather rapid event that can proceed without
certain time-consuming formalities, but it is a trial nonetheless. The core right
to a fair trial places an obligation upon state officials, either judge or
prosecutor, to ensure that a conviction is never registered in the absence of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
There are many who will contest the relevance of the European experience
because of the belief that North-American crime rates are four or five times
greater than the crime rates in Europe. 240 According to this view, Europeans
can afford the luxury of conducting trials in all cases because they are not
burdened by courtrooms that are bursting at the seams. John Langbein has
responded to this argument by claiming that plea bargaining is not a product
of burgeoning crime rates. He points to plea bargaining in Britain, where the
practice is common despite the fact that Britain's crime rates resemble those of
continental Europe. 241 He claims that plea bargaining is a product of the logic
of adversary criminal procedure. Practical impossibility might foreclose the
reform of plea bargaining, but an abstraction, like adversarial ideology,
should not stand in the way of reform.
Langbein's views are partially confirmed by recent studies that show that
the "case pressure" explanation for plea bargaining is vastly overstated. 242
Jurisdictions that have restricted plea bargaining did not necessarily experience crippling court overload; nevertheless, plea bargaining persisted largely
due to the organizational pressures upon counsel to conform and cooperate. 243 A recent study of the processing of cases in Philadelphia revealed
the startling fact that bench trials (similar to the streamlined uncontested trial
in Europe) did not take much more court time than the proper processing of a
guilty plea. 2 " The conclusion reached by the author of this study is worth

quoting in its entirety:
240G. Arzt, "Responses to the Growth of Crime in the United States and Germany: A

Comparison of Changes in Criminal Law and Societal Attitudes" (1979) 12 Cornell Int'l L.J.
43. At p. 44 he states that there are 300% more rapes and burglaries in the U.S. than in
Germany, and 700% more robberies.
241 Supra, note 239 at 209-210.
242
See Heumann, "A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure"(1975) 9 Law & Soc. Rev. 515;
M. Feeley, The Process is the Punishment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1979) at
247-261; S.Schulhofer, "Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable" (1984) 97 Harv. L.Rev. 1037.
243 For a recent study that partially attributed the persistence of plea bargaining to internal group
dynamics, see R. Weninger, "The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso,
244Texas" (1987) 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 265.

Schulhofer, supra, note 242 at 1084-1085.
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Plea bargaining is not inevitable. In most American cities, judges and
attorneys have chosen to process cases that way. The Supreme Court has
chosen to tolerate, to legitimate, and finally to encourage the plea
bargaining system. We can instead choose, if we wish, to afford criminal
defendants a day in court. We can cease imposing a price, in months or
years of incarceration, upon defendants who exercise that privilege, and
can instead permit or even encourage defendants to ask for a hearing in
which they may put the prosecution to its proof. We can make available a
formal bench trial that permits the expeditious but fair and accurate
resolution of criminal cases on the basis of public testimony, tested and
challenged with the traditional tools of American adversary procedure. If
we nevertheless continue to tolerate plea bargaining, that choice will not
tell us that resources are too scarce or that other lawyers, those over there
in court, are impatient with zealous advocacy and uncontrollably drawn
to more comfortable modes of work. A choice to prefer plea bargaining to
an inexpensive, feasible adversary trial will instead tell us a great deal
245
about ourselves.
Before implementing a ban upon pleading guilty and negotiating pleas of
guilt, it will be necessary to collect empirical data which might indicate how
this proposal would affect the allocation of resources in the justice system. In
addition studies must be conducted to determine how it is that European
courts have not collapsed under the pressure of increasing court dockets.
Some of the factors that have been identified in the maintenance of a
manageable court load in Europe are the following: (i) less criminalization of
conduct in Europe; (ii) the shifting of minor offences from criminal courts to
administrative penal proceedings; (iii) the simplicity of European evidentiary
rules; (iv) the use of a mixed tribunal of lay and professional judges who
deliberate together instead of an independent jury of laypersons; (v) the
willingness of defendants to confess; and (vi) the complete and open
prosecutorial discretion that facilitates the decision whether or not to contest
the accusation. 246 Reliance upon waiver cannot be displaced without some
modification of other components of the criminal justice system. It may be a
difficult task, but those who assert its impossibility are merely asserting their
reluctance to try.

VII. CONCLUSION
North American criminal justice is permeated by a "trafficking ethos" 247
that allows for the trading, selling, bartering and waiving of fundamental
2451Ibid. at 1107.
246
Stepan, supra, note 116 at 197-199; Schlesinger, "Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea
for Utilizing Foreign Experience" (1976) 26 Buffalo L.Rev. 361 at 381.
247 Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics (New York: H. Holt, 1915) at 57-8.
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constitutional rights. This model of justice is an extension of a contractarian
view which sees the world as a collection of self-interested individuals who lay
the foundation for an efficient marketplace by commodifying and bargaining
over all aspects of their lives; however, "it is a mistake to use the rights and
obligations dependent upon conventionalized prior transactions as a model
for all rights and obligations". 248 Constitutional legal rights are unique. They
aspire to an immutable institutional arrangement in which the power and
authority of the state is carefully limited. Their dissimilarity from ordinary
rights that order private relationships cannot be ignored and "in being
independent of prior transactions between parties concerned, these rights and
obligations are not, in many cases, directly negotiable by the parties". 249
Waiver of constitutional rights is a practice that must be viewed with
suspicion. Only those derivative rights for which "functional alternatives"
exist should be subject to waiver, and all other core rights must be seen as
mandatory rights which must be claimed by the rights-bearer for the benefit of
all. Only by recognizing the collective nature of these rights can we hope to
accomplish the great objectives of a Constitution. The persistent haggling and
bargaining over the exercise of rights reduces the status of constitutional
rights to mere bargaining chips that can be manipulated by agents of the state
and agents of the accused.
A scheme of inalienable rights will invariably increase the costs of the
administration of justice; however, there usually is some expense involved in
staying true to principle. In discussing the burdens imposed upon the state in
providing adequate judicial resources to facilitate trial within a reasonable
time Mr. Justice Lamer noted that "we cannot shrink from our task of
interpreting the Charterin a full and fair manner, even when, and perhaps
especially when, we are confronted with the possibility of resulting significant
institutional adjustment". 250 In a similar vein, Mr. Justice Goldberg of the
U.S. Supreme Court echoed the same sentiment in stating that "if the exercise
of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of law enforcement then
there is something very wrong with that system". 25'
Waiver exposes the false promise of the Constitution. Those who waive
rights may appear to possess the strength and power of free choice, but, in
actuality, they are succumbing to the pressures of a system that cannot afford
to live up to its ideals. The poet, Stevie Smith, may have been more
preoccupied with her own fears of death than with the plight of criminal
defendants, but she perfectly characterized the actions of those persons
commanded to appear in our courts when she coined the phrase "not waving,
but drowning".
248

Brown, "Inalienable Rights" (1955) 64 Philos. Rev. 192 at 205.
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at 206.

250Mills, supra, note 4 at 555.
2I Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 at 490 (1964).

